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Abstract
The focus of this paper is on citizens’ satisfaction with the German democratic political
system. This paper presents an argument to the effect that the performance records
of both the economy and the government in power have substantial impacts on the
levels of popular satisfaction with the regime. This theoretical stance contradicts the
cultural vision of democratic stability and its thesis that political culture, with its inertial
qualities, provides stable moorings for a political system. The results presented here
suggest that Reunification has taken its toll on the German political system. In the
New Federal States satisfaction with the Federal Republic’s political system remains
very low and this dissatisfaction has spread into West Germany. Public satisfaction
with the system in the West has sunk to its lowest level since data have been collected
on this phenomenon. The sources of this are to be seen in both economic
developments and government performance. Contrary to the culturalist vision of the
Federal Republic’s democracy, satisfaction with the political system in Western
Germany is not a given; citizens modify their views on the system in light of both the
government’s and the economy’s successes and failures. The dynamic is similar in
the East. The economic strains of Reunification and the perception that the federal
government is not making sufficient efforts to bring East German living standards up
to those of the West have kept the population there from committing themselves to the
system. While most East Germans now admit that it was not a mistake to have merged
with the Federal Republic and accept its political model, little enthusiasm exists for
that model or for the economic system linked to it.
Zusammenfassung
Im Mittelpunkt dieses discussion papers steht die Zufriedenheit der Bundesbürger mit
dem bestehenden deutschen demokratischen System. Die Argumentation zielt darauf
ab, daß sowohl die Leistungsfähigkeit der Wirtschaft wie der Regierung das Ausmaß
der Zufriedenheit der Bevölkerung mit dem politischen System bestimmen. Dieser
theoretische Ansatz widerspricht der These von der kulturellen Fundierung
demokratischer Stabilität und der daraus abgeleiteten Behauptung, daß die politische
Kulturmit ihrensich nur allmählich wandelnden Eigenschaften zur stabilenVerankerung
des politischen Systems beiträgt. Die hier präsentierten Ergebnisse machen deutlich,
welchen Preis das politische System für die Wiedervereinigung zahlen mußte. In den
neuen Bundesländern ist die Zufriedenheit mit dem politischen System der
Bundesrepuklik noch immer sehr gering - und diese Unzufriedenheit macht sich auch
in Westdeutschland breit. Die Zufriedenheit der Bürger im Westen mit dem politischen
System ist auf den niedrigsten Stand, seitdem Daten über dieses Phänomen erhoben
worden sind, gesunken. Ursachen sind die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und die
Regierungspolitik. Entgegen der kulturellen These über demokratische Stabilität ist die
Zufriedenheit mit dem politischen System in Westdeutschland demzufolge nicht einfach
nur gegeben: Bürger verändern ihre Einstellungen zum System aufgrund der Erfolge
und Mißerfolge der Regierung und der Wirtschaft. Im Osten verhält es sich ähnlich. Die
wirtschaftlichen Anstrengungen der Wiedervereinigung wie auch der Eindruck, die
Bundesregierung unternehme nicht genügend, um den Lebensstandard der
Ostdeutschen dem der Westdeutschen anzugleichen, hielt die Bevölkerung davon ab,
sich zu dem System zu bekennen. Obwohl die meisten Ostdeutschen der Vereinigung
mit der ehemaligen Bundesrepublik mittlerweile zustimmen und das bestehende
politische Modell akzeptieren, ist indessen die Begeisterung dafür nur mäßig, ebenso
wie für das damit verbundene Wirtschaftssystem.
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Introduction1
At the time of writing Germany has been unified for a little over six years. A large
number of reports have described the complexities and problems involved in this major
undertaking. In this paper a problem is addressed which, while it has not been
overlooked, has yet to receive much systematic treatment. The focus is on the domestic
political repercussions of this experience and, in particular, the question of whether the
pains and trials of these years have taken a toll on citizens’ satisfaction with the German
democratic political system. Is the German political system once again confronting a
crisis, or is it managing to overcome the challenges that confront it during a period when
it is engaged in attempting to foster internal unity while simultaneously preparing itself
for further integration with the European Union?2
This paper presents an argument to the effect that the performance records of
both the economy and the government in power have substantial impacts on the levels
of popular satisfaction with the regime. This theoretical stance contradicts the cultural
vision of democratic stability and its thesis that political culture, with its inertial qualities,
provides stablemoorings fora political system. Nevertheless, it needs to be emphasized
at the outset that this paper does not contain the argument that the German political
system is collapsing or is on the verge of collapse. A large number of conditions would
have to be in place for a collapse to occur.3 But it should be kept in mind that one of
the many conditions that endanger the legitimacy of a regime is widespread popular
dissatisfaction with its performance. This condition is the focus of the paper.
1. My thanks to Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, Bob Hancké, Britta Heinrich, Bruce Kogut, Ken
Newton, David Soskice, and Anne Wren for their helpful comments and suggestions
on this paper. Thanks also to Dieter Fuchs, Max Kaase, Hans-Dieter Klingemann,
Regine Sühring, and the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung in Cologne for
providing access to some of the data sources used.
2. On Germany’s current problems and allusions to their similarity with the early 1930s,
see, e.g., Helmut Schmidt’s open letter to Bundesbankpräsident Hans Tietmeyer in
Die Zeit (Nov. 8, 1996), The Economist’s survey of Germany (Nov. 9, 1996), E. J.
Dionne’s op.ed. piece in the International Herald Tribune (Feb. 11, 1997), and Assheuer
and Mießgang’s interview with Karl Heinz Bohrer in Die Zeit (Mar. 7, 1997).
3. See Lepsius (1978) on the factors and events surrounding the collapse of the Weimar
Republic and Rogowski (1974) on the more general question of the factors that
undermine any rational citizen’s belief in the legitimacy of the current regime.
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The most important results of the paper can be summarized briefly here. The
process of Reunification has taken its toll on the German political system. Not only has
East German satisfaction with the Federal Republic’s political system remained very
low, but this dissatisfaction has spread into West Germany. Public satisfaction with the
system in the West has sunk to its lowest level since data have been collected on this
phenomenon. The sources of this are to be seen in both economic developments and
government performance. Contrary to the culturalist vision of the Federal Republic’s
democracy, satisfaction with the political system in Western Germany is not a given;
citizens modify their views on the system in light of both the government’s and the
economy’s successes and failures. The dynamic is similar in the East. The economic
strains of Reunification and the perception that the federal government is not making
sufficient efforts to bring East German living standards up to those of the West have
kept the population there from committing themselves to the system. While most East
Germans now admit that it was not a mistake to have merged with the Federal Republic
and accept its political model, little enthusiasm exists for that model or for the economic
system linked to it.
The next section provides some background. It focuses primarily on the public’s
mood in both East and West and developments in the economy since the "Wende"
(revolutionary turn). An effort is made to systematically portray the ways in which public
opinion has reacted to various developments during this time and to sketch a number
of important macroeconomic trends. It then goes on to describe trends in popular
attitudes toward the government and the political system as a whole. In the succeeding
section attention turns to the determinants of levels of citizen satisfaction with the
German political system. A model of the dynamics of satisfaction with the political
system among West German citizens during the period from 1977 through 1995 is
presented and empirical evidence provided that demonstrates the importance of
economicconditionsand governmental performance in thesedynamics. A more modest
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effort is then undertaken to show how perceptions of government’s efforts in the East
as well as expectations about economic developments there have influenced
satisfaction with federal government and, in turn, the overall political system. The last
section discusses the implications of these results in light of expectations regarding
both future government policy and macroeconomic developments within both regions
of Germany.
Background
While the idea of a unified Germany was of great importance to West German
citizens during the 1950s and 1960s, its significance had receded dramatically by the
early1970s (seeFigure 1).4 In part as a response to the Ostpolitik of thenew government
under Chancellor Brandt as well as to the Berlin Agreements, the issue never again
was seen as an important problem until the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of
the SED regime in the German Democratic Republic. Correspondingly, the desirability
of Reunification as well as its possibility declined in public sentiment in the Federal
Republic. While approximately 80 percent held it to be desirable in the 1950s, sentiment
in support of Reunification declined to approximately 60 percent in the 1970s and early
1980s. Approximately 40 percent saw it as an impossibility in the 1950s. This had
risen to approximately 70 percent in the 1970s (Best, 1990, pp. 11-13).
After the Fall of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989 and the Volkskammer
Elections in March of 1990, the issue of Reunification was clearly on the table. However,
in the minds of the people it did not have a high priority. Certainly in both East and
West large parts of the populaces saw it as an important issue. Approximately 51
percent in the East and 28 percent in the West held it to be very important. Nevertheless,
4. Note that all tables and figures are placed in the Appendix (pp. 53-101) to this paper.
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in comparison with other goals and problems, this issue was accorded relatively low
ranking in terms of the priorities held by both populations. The May/June 1990 IPOS
surveys in bothRepublics registered thisgoal aswell behindmanyothers thatconcerned
people (see Table 1). Law and order, economic conditions, the environment and even
the reduction of bureaucracy ranked higher in their estimations. Reunification was
important to both peoples, but little more so than the goal of European Unification.
Support for Reunification was widespread in both regions but the hope was that
it be delayed and not rushed. During May and June of 1990 widespread support was
registered for such an undertaking in both populaces . In the East, about 94 percent
supported Reunification while three percent were opposed and approximately the same
small number were indifferent to it. Support was less widespread in the West, but,
nevertheless, about 76 registered their approval of Reunification, and about 15 percent
opposed, while 9 percent were indifferent. However, when one takes into account
attitudes toward the speed at which Reunification should occur, a somewhat more
equivocal image of popular support for Reunification emerges (see Table 2). Thus,
only 39 percent of the East German population at the time of the signing of the
Reunification Treaty actually advocated a quick or immediate merger of the two states.
A much larger group, 55 percent, while in favor of Reunification, felt the it should not
occur quickly. A similar picture is to be found in Western popular sentiment. Only about
25 percent of the populace in the West supported a rapid Reunification. A majority,
over 51 percent, felt that it should occur slowly.5
5. As Kuechler (1993) notes, the pattern of general support but extensive reservations
along with a desire to take a "go-slow" approach to the Reunification project was
widespread within both populations. In conjunction with the events of this time,
especially the diplomatic success of Chancellor Kohl in winning support forReunification
from both the Soviets and the western allies and the CDU’s electoral success in the
Volkskammer elections of March, a picture emerges that suggests the leaders rather
than the masses were more important in shaping the outcome.
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Hesitancy also characterized West German opinion about whether their system
of government be retained or altered with the inclusion of 16 million new citizens.
Questioned in February of 1990 about what form of government should follow
Reunification, the West German population was very divided. While 44 percent favored
the entry of the New States with a continuation of the Federal Republic’s Grundgesetz
(Basic Law or constitution), 38 percent felt that unification of the two Republics should
beaccompanied by a new constitution, and18 percent were undecided (Noelle-Neuman
and Köcher, 1993). However, the March Politbarometer Survey of the West in that
sameyear saw a far greater percentage in support of retaining the Basic Law (60 percent
for retention; 35 percent for new constitution, and 5 percent undecided). Furthermore,
in this same survey, 79 percent of West Germans held the opinion that it was necessary
that a plebiscite/referendum of the population be held in order to decide whether
Reunification should occur.
The two populations had very different expectations about the implications of
Reunification in the late spring of 1990. In the East, a large majority expected that the
results of unification for the East would be mainly advantageous (see Table 3). About
63 percent held this opinion, while only about 6 percent expected the results to be
principally disadvantageous, and about 31 percent anticipated mixed results. In the
West, however, expectations were markedly less sanguine; only 28 percent expected
that Reunification in the main would bring advantages with it, while a nearly equal
number, i.e., 24 percent, saw disadvantages in Reunification, and 47 percent expected
that the results would be mixed.
A major attraction in Reunification for the citizens of the GDR was the hope that
with it would come the higher living standards prevalent in the Federal Republic. Still,
when asked in late spring of 1990 most (i.e., 68 percent) citizens in the GDR were
unsure how long it would take for Eastern living standards to be brought up to those
found in the West (see Table 4). Of those willing to express an opinion, most saw this
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achievement of parity coming before the end of the century (25.9 percent) and very few
expected it to take longer. In the West, there was far greater willingness to express an
opinion and indeed most seem to have had an optimistic outlook with respect to
achieving this goal. Thus, 30 percent of the Westerners believed parity in living
standards would come about within 5 years. More than three quarters believed it would
occur by the end of the century.
Within two years, however, the picture had changed dramatically. Thus, in 1992
most Easterners had formulated expectations about the time it would take to achieve
parity, and they foresaw that its attainment would extend beyond the end of the century
(nearly 69 percent anticipating it would not occur before the century was out). Similarly
in the West, expectations were lowered, with about 66 percent expecting the
achievement of parity to occur after the century was out and only 32 percent expecting
it to occur sooner. Three years later, i.e., in 1995, Eastern sentiment was even more
pessimistic. Very few believed it had already occurred or would occur before the end
of the century. The overwhelming majority (83 percent) thought it would occur after
2000, and, indeed, 33 percent believed it would take place after the year 2006.
Sentiment in the West had meanwhile become more optimistic. Indeed, in the 1994
Politbarometer survey, about 29 percent suggested parity had already been achieved.
Less than 20 percent anticipated in 1995 that this condition would not come about
before 2006.
Macroeconomic Developments
Many consider West German macroeconomic performance in the post-World War
II era to have been one of the best in the industrialized world. Clearly its achievements
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attracted the admiration of many of the citizens of the GDR.6 Among the 16 largest
OECD economies it had the fourth highest growth in productivity per worker between
1950 and 1988 (Cusack, 1995). Its remarkable achievement, however, was not
unmarred by downturns nor was it able to avoid the general growth slow-down common
to the industrialized countries throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, while average
annual growth in real GDP per capita was 3.5 percent in the 1960s, it slowed to 2.9
percent in the 1970s, and slumped further to 1.6 percent through the 1980s (see Figure
2).
While West Germany managed to avoid the recession other EC countries were
falling into at the end of the 1980s, the boost from Reunification was short-lived. Indeed,
the average annual growth rate in income per capita since 1990 has been a post-war
period low of 1.4 percent. Figure 3 traces out the development of income per capita in
both the East and West since immediately prior to Reunification. Note that as the Berlin
Wall fell East Germany reputedly had an income per capita level equal to 48 percent
of that in the West. Eastern gross domestic income levels dropped dramatically in 1990
and 1991 (14 and 20 percent respectively) so that by the end of Germany’s first full
year as a unified state, the Eastern region’s income levels were slightly less than 32
percent of those to be found in the West. The next four years brought significant growth
in the East and relative stagnation in the West. By 1995, real income levels in the West
were 9 percent higher than those in 1989 while those in the East were 7 percent lower
6. Claus Offe (1996) has pointed out that the sources of collapse of the GDR regime
and the attraction of Reunification were dominantly economic. And, indeed, the
transformation program being carried out since Reunification defines success
predominantly in economic terms.
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than that year.7
Unemployment has proven to be very problematic in both regions since
Reunification. The Federal Republic official unemployment rates since 1950 are plotted
in Figure 4. The boom years of the 1950s saw a significant reduction in unemployment
so that by the 1960s unemployment was often hovering at an extraordinary low rate of
1 percent. The first Oil Crisis dramatically pushed this up and the 1980s saw an even
more dramatic rise in unemployment with it peaking at slightly more than 9 percent.
Unemployment in the West had inched down to slightly less than 7 percent by 1989.
However, shortly after Reunification unemployment was once again on the rise and by
the first half of 1996 it had managed to go to the 10 percent level -- the highest rate of
unemployment since 1950. Developments in the East were far worse. Official
unemployment sky-rocketed and has been hovering at or above the 15 percent level
since 1992.
An even more dismal picture of the East German labor market is revealed when
a closer examination is undertaken. Figure 5 presents the labor market positions of
the working age population in the region from before the time of the Wende until late
1994. In the first half of 1989, i.e., before the collapse of the SED regime, the East had
one of the world’s highest official labor force participation rates (nearly 92 percent). By
the 2nd half of 1990, i.e., around the time of Reunification, this had dropped to about
76 percent. 13 percent of the working age population had been shifted into one or
another "labor market scheme" (viz., early retirement, "short-hours work," "work
7. As pointed out below, the significant flow of transfers by the governmental sector to
the East has played a major role in helping the region of the former GDR to avoid an
even more catastrophic decline in economic well-being. Indeed, in the absence of net
public transfers from West to East, the real GDP per capita levels in 1995 stood at only
49 percent of the level of 1989, as opposed to 93 percent.
Note as well that 1996 saw significant declines in real GDP growth rates in both regions.
In the West, the annual growth rate dropped from 1.6 percent in 1995 to 1.3 percent
through 1996. In the East the corresponding figures were 5.3 and 2.0 (Statistisches
Bundesamt, Mitteilung für die Presse, January 9, 1997).
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creation" projects, training programs), 6 percent were officially unemployed and about
5 percent were outside of the labor market. Only 60 percent were in regular employment
two years later, 16 percent were in labor market schemes, over 11 percent were officially
unemployed, and nearly 13 percent were out of the labor market. By the last half of
1994 (the last period for which complete data are available), the employment rate had
remained relatively stable (61 percent), over 11 percent were in labor market schemes,
nearly 10 percent were officially unemployed, and the category of those outside the
labor market had ballooned to 18 percent of the working age population.
Despite these developments in the labor market and the overall economy, the
situation in terms of the living standards for the populations in both regions, particularly
in the East, has not been what one need necessarily characterize as dismal. Table 5
provides some information on disposable household income in both regions.
Regardless of what measure one might care to use, there has been appreciable
progress in improving the absolute and relative standards of living in the East. Using
oneset ofestimates (employing ameasure ofequivalent income), disposable household
income in the East has risen from 46 percent of the level of the West in 1991 to 73
percent in 1994. However, there has been a modest increase in inequality in income
distribution in the East but it still has not reached the levels prevalent during the 1990s
in the West.
Nominal real wage levels for the average worker in both regions have increased,
particularly in the East.8 However, if one takes into account the appreciable growth in
the taxation rates (in both regions), wage performance differs dramatically across the
8. Data on gross and net wages come from various volumes of the Statistisches
Bundesamt, Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen, Kontent und Standardtabellen:
Hauptbericht. Fachserie 18, Reihe 1.3. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt. Data
on consumer prices come from various volumes of the Statistisches Bundesamt, Preise:
Preisindizes für die Lebenshaltung. Fachserie 17, Reihe 7. Wiesbaden: Statistisches
Bundesamt.
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two regions. There has been significant growth in real take-home pay in the East (see
Figure 6) since 1991, the first year for which data are available. On the other hand,
wage developments in the West have been anything but rosy (see Figure 7). Real
take-home pay of the average worker has declined significantly since 1990, when it
peaked as a consequence of the tax reforms introduced that year. Since then, it has
declined almost every year, and, indeed, the 1995 average real net wage had returned
to near the level where it stood in 1979. While real gross wages have increased, the
burden of taxation increases, imposed mainly to help cover the costs of Reunification,
have sent net wages plummeting. These different trajectories, growth in the East,
decline in the West, have helped to eliminate a significant proportion of the net wage
gap between East and West. In the first quarter of 1991, net real wages in the East
were approximately 49 percent of those in the West. By the last quarter of 1995, they
stood at approximately 68 percent -- despite the much higher rates of inflation in the
East.9
Governmental transfers from the West to the East have been used to soften the
transition in the latter region. Table6 provides an overview of the net budgetary transfers
since 1991. While not an overwhelming drain on the West German economy (they
have risen from 4 percent to 4.9 percent of that region’s GDP), they account for an
extraordinarily large share of the income going to the residents of the East (over 51
percent of Eastern GDP in 1991 and nearly 40 percent in 1995). On a per capita basis,
they represent a significant subsidy to the citizens of the region. Not accounted for in
these sums are various off-budget programs which were involved in the restructuring
of the East German economy, including the Treuhandanstalt, the Unity Fund and the
Inherited Debt Fund. In the restructuring of governmental accounts in 1995 the vast
debts built up by these programs were brought into the accounts. Together with some
9. Consumer price levels in the West during the fourth quarter of 1995 were 13.6 percent
higher relative to the first quarter of 1991. In the East they were 34.5 percent higher.
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other changes in the public sector ledgers, they helped to greatly expand the total
government deficit in 1995 (see Figure 8), and thereby sharply increased the overall
debt burden (see Figure 9).
The equalization of living standards across the two regions of Germany has been
one of the principal goals of the government’s program since Reunification. Such
convergence serves a useful political function and, indeed, is broadly mandated by the
BasicLaw of the Federal Republic. While convergencehas not been achieved, progress
in equalizing living conditions has occurred. However, the way in which this partial
convergence has come about can not be characterized as optimal. In the West, the
economy has stagnated, unemployment has surged, and real take-home pay has
declined. In the East, income levels have risen but the pace of growth is slackening.
No self-sustaining development is occurring and an excessively large share of East
German income represents public transfers into the region. How long such
open-handed generosity can be sustained is an open question, both politically and
economically. At the same time a third of the East’s potential labor forced has been
banished from employment and the prospects for most of these people ever returning
to a job are, at best, limited.
Popular Evaluations of Economic and Other Developments
Objectively speaking one could conclude that West German efforts at easing the
transition to a market economy for the citizens of the former GDR embody a major
undertaking. However, since the outset the sentiment in the East has been one that
regards this effort as insufficient (see Table 7). Until the beginning of 1995, an
overwhelmingmajority expressed the opinion that the Bonn government was not making
a sufficient effort to improve living standards and thereby establish parity with the West.
Only toward the end of 1995 did this level of criticism dip markedly, but even then a
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majority of Easterners still clung to this opinion. On the other hand, the West Germans
increasingly diverged from this view. At the beginning of 1991, 42 percent were critical
of the government’s efforts in that they held them to be insufficient. By the last half of
1995, only 15 percent felt that too little was being done. Table 8 provides information
on the Easterners’ attitudes toward the entire effort at equalizing living standards. A
picture somewhat similar to that with respect to the government’s efforts alone is evident
-- with massive dissatisfaction being registered through much of the period but declining
appreciably in more recent times. Simultaneously, the table also shows that the citizens
in the West increasingly rejected the idea that the Easterners’ complaints are justified.
Parallelling these developments are the trends in support for the goal of bringing
about equality in living standards between the two regions. While this goal still retains
overwhelming support in the East, nevertheless there has been a decline in backing
for the goal within the region so that starting at a level of 83 percent in 1991, support
fell to about 72 percent by 1995 (see Table 9). Even immediately after Reunification
there was not much support for this policy goal in the West. Only about 35 percent saw
this as an important objective. Support has eroded in this region as well with only 25
percent still holding this to be an important objective in 1995.
Prior to Reunification, there were generally high hopes with respect to how the
general situation would evolve. This was particularly the case in the East. However,
since that time many Easterners and Westerners report that the process has developed
in ways worse than they anticipated (See Table 10). Indeed, in the East, after only a
few months (that is, in the first quarter of 1991) 64 percent indicated that developments
were worse than expected. This disappointment on the Easterners’ part diminished
somewhat but then rose again by the middle of 1993 where in the second quarter of
that year nearly 59 percent reported that developments were worse than expected.
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This too was the time when the Westerners saw developments in their darkest terms.
Since then and through the end of 1995, both populations have become less
disappointed in developments.
In terms of their own personal situation, however, Easterners report far less
disappointment in terms of the expectations they had about what Reunification would
bring them (Table 11). Indeed, though subject to significant swings over the first five
years, a very large share of the Easterners (in the last quarter of 1995: 79 percent)
have come to see their expectations as having been fulfilled.
On the economic side, the Easterners’ evaluation of both the overall situation and
their own personal situation mirror their reports on the fulfilment of their expectations
about Reunification. Very few have judged the overall economic situation to be good,
but the share of the population characterizing it as bad has diminished, particularly
through 1994 and 1995 (see Table 12). While few have expected the economic situation
in the short term future (i.e., one year) to get worse, the largest percentage have
generally expected overall conditions to remain the same as opposed to improving (see
Table 13). In terms of assessments of their own economic situation, there has been a
fair amount of improvement over the years, but this receded significantly in the first half
of 1996 (see Table 14). And again, in terms of their expectations about how their own
economic situation would develop over the immediate short term, the tendency to see
little change therein quickly became and remained relatively widespread throughout
the population (Table 15). Tables 16 through 19 provide comparable data for West
Germany during the periods both before and after Reunification.
While economic issues are paramount, there are other concerns as well. Table
20 broadens the picture with respect to how citizens in the region of the former GDR
evaluate their situation. Here information on their views with respect to a number of
social conditions and whether things have improved, stayed the same, or deteriorated
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since before the Wende are presented. Questions were asked on these matters toward
the end of each year from 1992 through 1995 in the Politbarometer surveys. In terms
of individuals’overall personal situations, the trend has been toward judging thesituation
as being better than before the collapse of the SED regime. Thus, around 49 percent
indicated that their general situation had improved in 1992 and this rose to about 71
percent in late 1995. While around a quarter of the population (in 1992) believed that
their personal situation had deteriorated with Reunification, this shrank to about 10
percent in 1995. Still, at this late date nearly 30 percent of the population claimed that
their lives had not improved. Assessments of their own economic situations parallel
these trends. The most marked improvement appears to be in how Easterners assess
the situation with respect to personal freedom. Very few suggest that this has worsened
and the overwhelming majority (about 81 percent in 1995) indicate that there have been
improvements in this regard. However, two areas stand out in terms of the negative
assessments Easterners provide with regard to developments since before the fall of
the SED regime. Thus, the area of social security is seen by a large majority (61 percent
in both 1992 and 1995) as having deteriorated. Parallel to this, ever larger numbers
(including a majority in 1994 and 1995) report that inter-personal relations have
deteriorated.
IPOS has surveyed both Easterners and Westerners on their satisfaction with a
menu of social conditions in every year since 1990. In Table 21 one can see further
evidence of distinctly different climates of opinion as well as the signs of deterioration
in the East. The gaps between both populations in terms of their satisfaction with all
eight areas (including education, equal rights, opportunities for advancement, social
security, the expectation of being treated justly, the economic situation, protection from
crime,and opportunities to acquire a job)are largeand in some cases they havewidened
significantly. Three areas stand out in terms of the collapse of morale in the East.
These include, first, equal rights, where in mid-1990, i.e., before Reunification,
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Easterners were even more likely than Westerners to believe that they had equal rights
(79 percent to 71 percent). While 73 percent of the Westerners still claimed to be
satisfied in this area in 1995, only 44 percent of the Easterners claimed such satisfaction.
The second area is protection from crime. In both regions there has been a drop in
satisfaction on this issue. But in the West it has been a much more moderate decline,
going from 63 percent in 1990 to 41 percent in 1995. In the East, however, while 58
percent expressed satisfaction in terms of protection from crime in mid-1990, only 14
percent indicated such satisfaction by 1995. There is not widespread satisfaction in
either population on the question of being able to obtain a job, but the pessimism in the
East is far more widespread than in the West. Only 9 percent of the Easterners in 1995
indicated satisfaction about this condition, while 38 percent did so in the West.
The broad discontent manifest in the East springs from a variety of sources.
Clearly, the hope for radical improvement in one’s own living standards, which has been
met for only part of the population, has contributed. Further, the widespread belief that
the entire Eastern economy has deteriorated and shows little sign of convergence to
Western levels has added to the pessimism. And some other social conditions that
were previously taken for granted, e.g., socio-economic equality, security from crime,
and employment, are widely seen as having vanished and thereby prompted a high
level of negativism. In such an atmosphere, there is often a tendency to seek out a
scapegoat. This is reflected in the frequent allusion to the idea that the East has been
"colonized" by the West (see Table 22).
The theme of colonization arose early in the Reunification process. Thus, in
November of 1990, only a month after Reunification, among those who indicated that
they had heard this term in public discussion, there were more people in the East (i.e.,
46%) who found it more appropriate than inappropriate (40%). The opposite was the
case in the West, where only 33% agreed with this characterization and 53% disagreed.
About a year later, sentiment in the East was even more emphatically in agreement
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with this portrayal. 53% found it appropriate while only 30% found it inappropriate.
Sentiment in the West had meanwhile moved in the opposite direction with 61% rejecting
this characterization and only 27% percent seeing it as accurate. Indeed, in other and
later surveys, Easterners tended overwhelmingly (approximately two-thirds in 1992,
1993, and 1994) to hold this view, while a much smaller number (approximately
one-third) ascribed to this characterization in the West (Bauer-Kaase and Kaase, 1996).
Reviewing an extensive set of questions on views with respect to responsibility for the
problems that have arisen in the Reunification process, Bauer-Kaase and Kaase (1996,
pp. 5-11) have demonstrated that East Germans overwhelmingly tend to see their
Western colleagues as having dealt poorly with the tasks of Reunification and with the
citizens of the East. At the same time, the Easterners strongly rejected negative
characterizations of their own roles and responsibilities in the process. Simultaneously,
Westerners seem to spread the blame -- holding both Easterners and themselves as
responsible for the problems.
Have East Germans given up hope and gone into a state of despair? What about
their fellow-citizens in the West, who seem less and less tolerant of the dissatisfaction
being expressed by the citizens in the New Federal States? Table 23 presents an
annual time series from a survey question asked every year since 1949 by Allensbach
that deals with the sentiments of populations in terms of their expectations about the
coming year. As can be seen in the column providing data on West Germany, the share
of the population looking forward with optimism to the coming year frequently went up
and down over the forty years prior to the Fall of the Wall. Indeed, this measure of
popular mood has generally moved in line with economic developments and major
political events. While optimism in the West certainly declined after Reunification, going
from 68 percent in 1989 to 34 percent in 1992, it moved up again and peaked at 57
percent in 1994 before dropping once more in 1995 and again in late 1996. East
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Germans have gone through the same swings but it is interesting to note here is that
the levels of optimism there have been somewhat higher than in the West ever since
1991 -- at least by this index.
Nevertheless, there is at least one sign of social malaise that suggests significant
problems for the German political system. As Putnam (1993) argues, one of the bases
for a stable and successful democratic system is a strong civic community. One of the
principal traits of such communities is a high level of social trust within the population.
He suggests that the major decline in this characteristic has helped bring about so many
of the political problems that have arisen within the American political system over the
last decades (Putnam, 1995) and the enduring problems in Southern Italy (Putnam,
1993). Table 24 reproduces results from Allensbach surveys that ask the question
scholars traditionally have used to measure social trust within populations. Despite the
low levels of civic community that, for example, Almond and Verba (1963) suggested
marked West German society, the tendency has been for this to rise over time. Indeed,
while still not high in comparison with a large number of other countries (see Table 25),
the long term trend prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall was upward with greater signs of
trusting on the part of the population. While these levels in the West have waxed and
waned since Reunification, the signs in the East are not very encouraging. Easterners
seem to have appreciably lower levels of trust then their Western colleagues and there
are few signs that significant improvement is in the offing.
One of the consequences of the discontent in the East is to be seen in the relatively
large numbers of people there which hold the view that the acceptance of the West
German model in 1990 was a mistake. Since 1992, IPOS and Politbarometer have
queried citizens in the region as to whether the decision implicit in the voting patterns
of the last Volkskammer election to accept the political order of the Federal Republic
was correct or not (see Table 26). Consistently, from 1992 through the first quarter of
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1995, over a quarter of the population held the view that the decision was a mistake.
However, in the latter half of that year the percentage of the population holding this
view dropped below 20 percent.
Even early on, i.e., in November of 1990, and continuing through 1993, a large
segment of the East German population expressed regret that a "third way" was not
taken and instead the Federal Republic’s "social market" (Soziale
Marktwirtschaft)-democratic system was implanted (Table 27). By 1993, 46 percent
indicated that such a third way would have been preferable, 21 percent were undecided,
and only 33 percent expressed satisfaction that the West German model was accepted.
Comparison with attitudes in the West at this date is instructive. Recall that in the spring
of 1990 there was a fair amount of sentiment supportive of an effort to create a new
form of governance. Nevertheless, three years later 70 percent of the Westerners
expressed satisfaction that the Federal Republic’s model had been retained in the
unified Germany, and only 10 percent expressed disappointment that another model
had not been adopted.
Intimately connected to the German political system is its economic system based
on "social-market" principles. As of 1994, most West Germans seemed satisfied with
this, at least when the option offered was an economic system organized on socialist
principles (see Table 28). East Germans can at best be described as ambivalent toward
market principles. In this same year, 1994, only 39 percent favored a market economy,
17 percent preferred a socialist system, and 44 percent could not decide which was
better. This ambivalence is a sharp reversal of earlier East German preferences. Prior
to experiencing the workings of a market system, i.e., in the Spring of 1990, an
overwhelming majority (i.e. 72 percent) had a favorable opinion of it. Three years later,
i.e., in the Fall/Winter of 1993, only 35 percent held such a good opinion of the market
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system. By late 1996 only 24 percent of East Germans had a favorable opinion of the
German economic system. It is clear that recently a large number of West Germans
have lost confidence in their economic system as well.
Government and the Political System
One can take from the description above that the Reunification process, which
has occupied the German people and government over these last six years, has not
been an unmitigated success in the eyes of the populations of either region. But then
it would be hard to claim that it has been a complete failure either. Still, while
expectations have been scaled back, and while more East Germans describe their own
economic situations as good, a large degree of pessimism abounds in both parts of
Germany. The federal government and, indeed, the entire political regime of the Federal
Republic have played a major role in helping to shape these developments. Have both
suffered as a consequence? More precisely stated, have German citizens lost
confidence in the federal government and has this in turnhad an impact on the legitimacy
of the democratic political system?
Tables 29 and 30 provide quarterly data on popular feelings toward the coalitions
that have governed in Bonn since 1977 in the West and 1990 in the East. Turning first
to the West, one can see that satisfaction has cycled throughout the entire period. And
while these cycles have continued during the period since Reunification, it is clear that
approval of government performance has generally been lower than before. Indeed,
it is only in this period where quarterly measures register a majority of the population
expressing dissatisfaction with the Bonn government.
It is interesting to note that there is little if any difference in the way Westerners
and Easterners have evaluated the Bonn government’s performance in the period since
Reunification. Not only are the absolute levels of satisfaction approximately the same
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(the average over the entire period in the West is 44.0 while that in the East is 43.1),
but the dynamics in both regions have been the same as well-- the over-time correlation
between the two regional series is .93.
Based on Eurobarometer surveys from 1976 through 1991, West Germany had,
on average, the second highest level of citizen satisfaction with the way its democratic
system worked when compared with thirteen other West European countries (Fuchs,
Guidorossi, and Svensson, 1995). And the satisfaction levels registered by the
Eurobarometer were relatively stable. Nevertheless, developments since Reunification
represent a significant departure from this auspicious situation. Tables 31 and 32
provide data on a number of regularly measured indicators of satisfaction with the
German political system. The Eurobarometer surveys (see Table 31) indicate that in
the West there was a sharp drop in satisfaction with democratic performance beginning
in 1991 and only slightly rising by 1994, the last year for which data are available from
this source. The IPOS survey, which annually poses a slightly different question,
registers a similar time profile.
A more extensive picture can be provided with a series that was constructed using
data from the Politbarometer surveys (see Table 32). The table details quarterly
measures from the second quarter of 1977 through the last quarter of 1996 on a question
dealing with satisfaction with the entire system of democracy in Germany. In the West,
shortly after Reunification, i.e., by the first quarter of 1991, satisfaction with the
democratic system in Germany began to drop. Going from approximately 81 percent
in the last quarter of 1990, the quarter in which Reunification occurred, it declined fairly
steadily until the third quarter of 1993, by which time only a slightly majority of the
population, i.e., 53 percent, indicated satisfaction. Since that quarter it moved generally
upwards but plummeted again in 1996 and indeed in the November of that year reached
the lowest level recorded in the series, i.e., 51.6 percent.
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In the East, the picture is much worse. In all three surveys satisfaction levels have
been appreciably lower than in the West. For example, using the Politbarometer
indicator, even at the outset, i.e., the last quarter of 1990, satisfaction levels were only
about 57 percent (i.e., 24 percent lower than in the West). This was the only quarter
in which a majority reportedsatisfaction. Indeed, at about the same time that satisfaction
levels had reached their nadir in the West, viz., in the latter part of 1993, they had
plummeted to an extraordinary low in the East, i.e., approximately 29 percent. A general
improvement was registered in the latter region during 1994 and 1995 but again, in late
1996, as in the West, it dropped significantly (this time to about 34 percent) Satisfaction
levels in both the East and the West have thus moved along similar trajectories since
Reunification (the correlation between the two series for the period from 1990.4 to
1996.2 is .76), but a very large gap in the levels of satisfaction with the regime persists.
In the West, then, we have seen a major reduction in what previously was, by
international standards, a high level of citizen satisfaction with the way the political
system works. In the East, there has been and continues to be great dissatisfaction
and only a minority basis of support for German democracy. The next section of this
paper deals with an attempt to explain why these patterns have come about.
The Dynamics of System Satisfaction: A Political-Economy Approach
Theorists and analysts traditionally have employed the distinction between
attitudes toward a democratic political system or regime, at one level, and government
or the authorities, at a lower level (Easton, 1975). Kaase and Newton (1995, p. 132)
suggest that this reflects the "central logic of democratic politics" which institutionalizes
the contest for governmental power at the level of authorities while restraining this
competition through the means of "non-partisan procedures and rules on the regime
level." Where this distinction is disputed, the controversy is based almost invariably
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on the way in which these terms have been operationalized and much less frequently
with respect to the conceptual difference being postulated (cf., Fuchs, 1992; Kuechler,
1991). There are certain widely-accepted ideas about these two variables (Easton,
1975). First, well-established and long legitimated regimes are less likely to be subject
to unbridled or sharp variations in the levels of support for and satisfaction with the
regime; at the same time, support for and satisfaction with a government is much more
volatile. Second, in newly established regimes, the willingness and ability of citizens
to differentiate between the two levels is generally less developed. This last point entails
that both variables are tightly linked, if not effectively fused, and the kind of volatility
one often sees in citizens’ assessments of government and authorities will be mirrored
in the volatility of their evaluations of and support for the system itself.
All this leaves open the question of what one should expect about the relationship
between the two levels in well-established and long legitimated regimes. Does
satisfaction with government performance feed into satisfaction with system
performance at all, or are these two completely decoupled? While the nearly one-to-one
knock-on effect between the two levels that one expects to find in recently established
systems should not hold in more established or "consolidated " systems, does this mean
that regardless of either sterling or miserable performance by incumbent governments,
no effect on system performance evaluations should be expected?
Related to the debate on the linkage between government performance and
regime performance is another controversy: can citizen satisfaction with political system
performance be undermined or buttressed by economic developments, or is the system,
particularly a more established and highly legitimate one, buffered from the winds and
tides of the economy? Few dispute that, at the lower level, governments are held by
the citizenry to be accountable to some extent for economic performance (Lewis-Beck,
1988). There is fairly wide agreement, but certainly no consensus, that economic
developments and satisfaction with political system performance are linked in newly
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established systems (Fuchs and Roller, 1994). However, some argue that with the
passage of time and good economic performance the political system becomes
anchored in the loyalties of citizens and the influence of the economy disappears or at
least is greatly diminished. Others, however, contend that no such decoupling occurs
in "consolidated" political systems and that economic performance retains an important
role in shaping citizens’ levels of satisfaction with the overall political system.
There are a variety of solutions that theorists have proposed with respect to these
issues. Two of the most divergent have been put forward by Weil (1989) and Fuchs
and Roller (1994). Figures 10 and 11 provide graphic portrayals of the two arguments.
Note the starkly different views on the two issues that have just been discussed. For
Weil, neither government performance nor economic performance plays a role in
citizens’ evaluations of the regime. While economic performance does have an impact
on evaluations of government in this model, it is neither directly nor indirectly connected
to the regime level. Simultaneously, government performance is completely detached
from regime performance. For Fuchs and Roller, completely opposite expectations
hold. Economic performance influences citizens’ evaluations of the democratic regime;
concurrently, evaluations of government performance feed into evaluations of the
democratic regime.
The Government-Regime Linkage
Thegovernment-regime linkage hasnot received an extensiveamount of empirical
study despite its theoretical centrality. One interesting study, and particularly relevant
because the West German case was included, is that conducted by Finkel, Muller and
Seligson (1989). Although they found that changes in government performance
evaluation fed into changes in evaluations of regimes, they concluded that their results
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implied that the macro-level consequences for the regime were minimal. Poor
performance, even during an economic crisis, does not seem to have much of a
"spill-over" effect from the government to the regime level.
On the other hand,a number of scholarshave been able to adduce strong evidence
in favor of a linkage between the two levels, in both consolidated and non-consolidated
democracies. Extensive time-series analyses of political-economic models of regime
satisfaction by Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg (1993), Kornberg and Clarke (1992), and
Widmaier (1989) have demonstrated an important link between the two with government
performance positively influencing evaluations of the regime. Fuchs and Roller (1994)
provide extensive documentation of the linkage in a number of the new democracies
in Central and Eastern Europe.10
A brief statistical exercise might shed some light on the question, at least with
respect to the situations in the two regions of Germany. For simplicity’s sake, let us
entertain the hypothesis that there is a important link between satisfaction with
government performance ( ) and satisfaction with regime performance ( ),
and that this can be illuminated even in the absence of specifying other factors that
shape satisfaction with regime performance.11 This can be done by estimating the
following regression equation with data on both East and West Germany:
One would expect a number of important things to emerge from this simple
exercise: (1) there would be statistically significant and positive coefficients (the ’s)
GSAT DSAT
DSATt = a + b GSATt + e t
b
10. Bauer-Kaase and Kaase (1996) report that in West Germany there is evidence of
an increasingly tighter coupling between the two levels which implies an erosion of
"some of the independent support for the political regime."
11. The data series used here are from Forschungsgruppe Wahlen and are reported
in Tables 29 and 30 as well as Table 32 of this paper.
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on the government satisfaction terms in the equations for both regions; (2) the coefficient
( ) for East Germany would approach 1 while that for West Germany would be
appreciably smaller; and (3) the constants (the ’s) in the two equations would be
positive but the East German figure would be much smaller than the West German
figure. The expectations regarding the size of parameter estimates for government
satisfaction follow directly from the hypothesis that citizens in non-consolidated systems
will not distinguish very much between the government and regime levels while those
in consolidated systems will do so. The expectations regarding the size the constant
terms follows directly from the idea that in non-consolidated systems there will be a
very low reservoir of tolerance for a regime while that level in a consolidated system
would be much higher.
The estimation results using quarterly data for this simple equation are reported below.
First, the results for East Germany since Reunification are provided. Then, three sets
of results for West Germany are reported. The first of these three provides information
on the lengthiest continuous period for which the estimation can carried out in light of
available data. This period extends from the second quarter of 1982 through the second
quarter of 1996. The other two sets of estimates for West Germany relate to the period
up until Reunification and then to the post-Reunification period, i.e., the same time
frame as that used for the East German estimation.
East
1990.4-1996.2
Averages: DSAT: 40.8, GSAT: 43.1
b
a
DSATt = 5.99
(2.75)**
+ .81
(16.23)**
GSATt
R2 = .92, r = .03, OLS
** = t stat sig . at .05;* = t stat sig . at .10.
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West:
1982.2-1996.2, n=53
Averages: DSAT: 68.0, GSAT: 49.5
1982.2- 1990.3
Averages: DSAT: 70.9, GSAT: 53.7
1990.4-1996.2
Averages: DSAT: 64.1, GSAT: 44.0
The results are illuminating and conform to the expectations outlined above. First,
note that in East Germany the apparent reservoir level of satisfaction with the regime
is quite small, approximately 6 percent; in contrast, the results for West Germany
suggest that a quite large reservoir exists -- over 40 percent of the population would
still be satisfied with the performance of the regime even if the whole population was
dissatisfied with the performance of the incumbent government. Second, while the
linkage between government performance and regime performance evaluations is quite
sizable in both regions of Germany, the implications of the parameter estimates are
such as to suggest that the knock-on effect in the East is close to one-to-one while that
in the West is only half that size. The sensitivity of regime performance evaluations to
government performance is thus appreciably greater in the Eastern region.
DSATt = 41.04
(17.89)**
+ .54
(11.98)**
GSATt
R2 = .72, r = .23, OLS
DSATt = 46.33
(8.73)**
+ .46
(4.67)**
GSATt
R2 = .42, r = .16, OLS
DSATt = 41.53
(17.77)**
+ .51
(9.93)**
GSATt
R2 = .82, r = .17, OLS
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The Economics-Politics Linkage
The economics-politics linkage is an important problem, and particularly in the
German context this is an weighty issue. Those who take a culturalist perspective have
the fundamental expectation that regime performance support and satisfaction levels
are very sticky due to their dependence on political cultural traits that themselves evolve
at a very slow pace. This implies, for example, that the economic miseries that
characterize both regions of present-day Germany should have very little or no impact
on satisfaction with the political system. While willing to admit that in the West German
case the consolidation of support and satisfaction with the system was greatly aided
by the "Wirtschaftswunder" in the early decades of the Republic, they contend that the
economic system’s performance has decreased significantly in its role as one of the
foundations of regime support (Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt, 1981; Conradt, 1980).
This rejection of a political-economic linkage is rather wide-spread in the literature
on regime satisfaction and support. A leading example of this way of thinking is to be
seen in Weil’s aforementioned model (1989) of the development of political support in
democratic systems which explicitly rejects the notion that economic performance
affects the support for democracy in either a direct or indirect fashion. Having examined
data on six Western democracies in the post-World War II era, he claims to have found
strong empirical evidence in favor of this rejectionist position.
In studies focused on Germany, similar claims are to be found. Gabriel (1989),
for example, while admitting that citizens’ evaluations of the performance of the
economy do have an influence on their satisfaction with the political system, greatly
qualifies this by arguing that this linkage has become very attenuated through the
passage of time. More recently, both Noelle-Neumann (1994) and Weil (1996) have
rejected such a linkage in the development of citizen satisfaction with democracy in the
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New Federal States of Germany. While Noelle-Neumann states that the prospects for
popular acceptance of democracy in East Germany are "bleak," she concludes that
"[t]he economic factor does not explain the problems encountered in the transition
towards democracy" there. Weil’s (1996) analysis leads him to the same conclusion.12
However, at least one analyst, Conradt (1980, p. 263), has been willing to admit that
this rejectionist position hinges on a critical assumption: viz., that both poor economic
performance is short-lived and that there is considerable turnover among those most
affected by it.13
Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg (1993) provide a good example of the contemporary
advocates of the position that there exists in modern democracies a close and important
linkage between economic performance and citizens’ satisfaction with and acceptance
of the political regime.14 They reject the hypothesis that political culture supplies "sturdy
12. A more differentiated argument focused on the transition to democracy in East
Germany is made by Schmidt (1992). While he agrees that economic developments
there have been bleak, and, therefore, this economic decline should have led to a
political crisis such as Germany experienced in the Weimar Republic, he argues that
two conditions have cut the link. First, the institutional framework of the German welfare
state, which has been transferred completely to the East, has shielded citizens there
from the negative effects of economic decline. Indeed, he argues that the financial
transfers to the East have actually increased the standard of living in the region.
Furthermore, he suggests that the pessimism regarding the future economic situation
in the Weimar era contrasts sharply with the guarded optimism about the long term
economic benefits held by the Easterners today. To be fair to Schmidt, he was writing
in 1992. But certainly the data reported earlier in this paper would seem to suggest
that this guarded optimism has turned somewhat sour. Second, the party system of
the Federal Republic as well as its interest associations have successfully integrated
Eastern citizens into a political system with far greater equilibrating capacities than that
which prevailed in the Weimar era.
13. Neither assumption seems to fit the German case. Long term unemployment in
the West has significantly increased from the early 1970s to the early 1990s. In 1970,
less than one percent of the labor force was unemployed and of this small group, about
9 percent had been unemployed for 12 months or more; in 1992, 6.6 percent of the
labor force was unemployed and a third of this group had been in that situation for a
year or more (OECD Employment Outlook, 1983 and 1994) and the economy has been
relatively stagnant. In the East the condemnation of large numbers of people to a place
outside the labor market which appears to amount to permanent exile is a salient
consequence of the introduction of the West German economic system to this region.
14. For a general statement of the position see Merkl (1988). In terms of the East
German situation, see Minkenberg (1993).
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moorings" for political systems and simultaneously dispute the claim that satisfaction
with the political system has a "lethargic" velocity. They argue that public sentiment,
not only for government, but also for the political system as a whole, is intimately linked
to evaluations of economic performance and government effectiveness. In addition,
given that economic performance in modern societies is often erratic, they expect that
satisfaction levels with the regime will reflect this instability. Their comparative study
of eight EC countries during the years between the late 1970s and late 1980s finds
support for this position. Similar evidence was found in the Kornberg and Clarke (1992)
study dealing mainly with Canada but also to a limited degree with the EC countries.15
Others have developed empirical evidence that are consistent with this position for both
consolidated (Lockerbie, 1993; Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Kuechler, 1991;
Bauer-Kaase and Kaase, 1996) and new democracies (Fuchs and Roller, 1994).
The Dynamics of System Satisfaction over the Long Term in the West
The model used to explain the long term dynamics of system satisfaction is
embodied in two basic equations. These equations are linked in a recursive way. The
first equation deals with government performance as measured by citizen satisfaction
with the performance of the governing coalition in the federal government. Government
performance is, in turn, a determinant of system performance as evaluated by citizens.
This is captured in the second equation where, in addition to a number of other factors,
satisfaction with government performance determines the level of regime or system
support as measured by satisfaction with the entire political system. A graphic
representation of the model is provided in Figure 12.
15. It should be noted that the authors are somewhat inconsistent in the characterization
of their results. In the 1992 study they claim that the impact of economic performance
(inflation and unemployment) is "substantial;" while in the 1993 study they are much
more moderate concluding that the impacts are "small."
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Satisfaction with government on the part of the population responds to economic
conditions, but, importantly, there are other factors that shape it. Included here are the
electoral calendar, extraordinary events, and the policies a government adopts and
maintains.
The long research tradition on government popularity and vote functions holds
that economic performance in industrialized democracies plays a significant role in the
support governments have among voters. While the instruments available to
governments to fine tune an economy’s performance are notoriously blunt (Lewis-Beck,
1988; Keech, 1995), and, depending one’s view, have always been ineffective, or are
increasingly ineffective under conditions of globalization, nevertheless, citizens are
seen as willing to assign both blame and credit to government in light of the prevailing
or anticipated economic performance (Anderson, 1995). Numerous research studies
on the thesis, while not uniform in the results they report, are generally supportive of
the underlying argument. Included in the specification of the forces shaping satisfaction
with government performance is a term for economic growth, the most general indicator
of economic performance.
Timing matters in politics. Indeed, one of the more widely accepted stylized facts
in the study of government popularity is the idea that there is a persistent rhythm to be
found in the public’s approval of a government through the election cycle (Anderson,
1995). There is a tendency for this approval to decline following entry into office and
than for this decline to be reversed as the next election approaches. Still, for some,
this cycle is engineered by government’s fine tuning of the economy. Predicated on
the notion that voters see government as responsible for economic outcomes and also
recall only the most recent success or failure, the constraints confronting government
then lead it to first slow the economy down and then to accelerate it in time for the next
election (Tufte, 1978). This most certainly overstates the adroitness and capacities of
government. At a minimum, though, one can appeal to a logic which suggests that
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government popularity will naturally be high after a successful election, enjoying both
the support of its constituents who have just elected it to office and the less solid but
nevertheless generally high level of tolerance many other voters are willing to grant it
at the outset. The effects of this honeymoon period necessarily diminish as the outlines
of government’s policy as well as its competence are revealed. All of this will tend to
undermine satisfaction and support. With the approach of an election, however, a
government needs to pay more attention to its popular support and this in turn will
generate greater efforts on its part to win over alienated voters (Frey, 1978). The
government may also benefit from the increasing salience of the election to the voters
as they come to examine more critically the opposition, its programs and apparent
competence. This focusing helps enhance its, the government’s, popularity.
Idiosyncratic events often have the effect of enhancing or diminishing government
popularity. While it is difficult to develop a systematic list of such events, we have
included two terms in the equation for government popularity whose impact should
have been profound. The first is meant to capture the euphoria that surrounded the
events associated with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the SED regime.
This takes on a value on "1" during that period and a "0" during all others. The second
is meant to capture the onset of anxiety and uncertainty that came with the beginning
of unification shortly after the first all-German Bundestag elections. This takes on a
value of "1" in the period immediately following these elections and a "0" otherwise.
The policies of government are posited as having an effect on its popularity.
Policies that diminish the well-being of citizens should lower popularity while those that
enhance their well-being should increase popularity. One of the major, but clearly not
the only, government policy with high salience in the public is taxation. High tax rates
on the average citizen generally are not welcome. Reductions in these tax rates
generally are met with approval. A measure of government’s tax policy (direct tax rate
on the average worker) is included in the model and its impact on government popularity
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is expected to be negative. This is not to deny that voters can have a reasonable or
evensophisticated appreciation of the connection between public spending and taxation
(cf., Peters, 1991; Confalonieri and Newton, 1995 ). Higher taxes, other things being
equal, translate into higher public services and income transfers. Two aspects of
taxation, one theoretical and the other empirical, warrant the inclusion of this variable
in the equation along with the expectation that its effects will be negative on satisfaction
levels. First, as Downs pointed out long ago (1960), taxes, and particularly direct taxes,
have far greater salience for the average citizen than the benefits that derive directly
to her or him. This would imply that a higher tax burden represents a decline in utility
which in turn should lower satisfaction with the agent imposing this loss. This is the
shadow side of the "fiscal illusion" effect often associated with indirect taxation. Second,
the inclusion of the tax variable in a equation during this period of time seems particularly
appropriate in light of the relatively slow growth that generally marked the period from
the late 1970s through the mid 1990s and both the salience and personal negative
utility that rising tax rates would have in such a context.
The approach taken with respect to system satisfaction posits that economic
developments are important and that the popularity of government itself contributes as
well. Poor governments undermine system satisfaction and support. Good
governments buttress them. In addition, the effect of replacing a incumbent government
through democratic means should help sustain both system satisfaction and support.
Two economic terms, dealing with inflation and unemployment, are included in
the specification of the factors shaping system satisfaction. Inflation and unemployment
are core concerns to the populace as well as to the political and economic elites of the
Federal Republic. This is historically rooted and the institutional set-up of the Federal
Republic’s political economy has been designed or, perhaps more accurately, has
evolved to prevent these problems from arising and thereby undermining the legitimacy
of the Republic and its political regime.
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The great inflation in the Weimar years (as well as that prior to the currency reform
in the late 1940’s) represents a core taboo in political culture the Federal Republic (Hall
and Franzese, 1996). Further, with the extensive independence and powers of the
Bundesbank (Kennedy, 1991; Cukierman, 1992), it is hard to blame a government when
the institution responsible for controlling inflation is extensively shielded from its
influence. But, still, the dangers of inflation are widely recognized, if not exaggerated,
and its presence saps confidence in the system and thereby weakens the legitimacy
of the political system.
Similarly, the problem of unemployment is critical to the foundations of the Federal
Republic. The German economic model (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) and its associated
elements of corporatism with the focus on consensus and the absence of class-warfare
was constructed and maintained in the post-World War period in order to help coordinate
the functioning of the labor market with the aim of assuring that the kind of mass
unemployment that helped sap the foundations of the Weimar Republic would not
arise.16 Government has had a limited role to play here, serving mainly as a moderator
between the "social partners" (Paqué, 1993). Nevertheless, high unemployment is not
politically neutral. It represents a failure of a tightly coordinated system based on a
complex series of shared understandings and compromises.17 Failures in the labor
market represent failures of the overall system and correspondingly weaken satisfaction
with and support for the political regime.
16. See Frey and Weck (1981) for an interesting study demonstrating the strong link
between unemployment and rise in the support for the anti-regime National Socialist
party during the Weimar era.
17. It should be pointed out that this tightly coordinated system extends to embracing
the Bundesbank and its passionate concern for inflation. For more extensive discussion
of the complexities of the German national economic institutional framework, see
Soskice (1990) and Hall and Franzese (1996).
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The government is an integral component of a political regime. It is usually the
most powerful and salient political institution within that regime - especially in a
democracy. Obviously, then, its performance should be firmly coupled to regime
satisfaction levels amongst citizens in a democracy. As demonstrated earlier, the scope
of this coupling will vary to the extent to which the system itself is consolidated.
Experiencing good government encourages citizens to attach loyalty to the regime that
has produced it. Exposure to poorly performing governments alienates citizens from
the regime. Persistently well performing governments solidify the legitimacy basis of
a regime, while long and continuous exposure to bad governments undermines
legitimacyand creates one of the conditions that enhances the likelihood that challenges
to the regime come about.
Change in governments, particularly in democratic regimes, may or may not lend
legitimacy to the system. In the event where a popular government coalition must
surrender office to another party or coalition there is likely to be a loss of system
legitimacy in a democratic regime. Replacing an unpopular government should have
the opposite effect, particularly if this is done within accepted rules and practices.
During the period of time under study (1977 through 1995) there was only one governing
coalition change and this took place in the early 1980’s when internal coalition
squabbling (in the context of decreasing voter support for the government) led to the
fall of the SPD-dominated government. Following a "affirmative"vote of "noconfidence,"
whereby the CDUcandidate forChancellor won a majority in the Bundestag, a CDU-FDP
coalition was formed and a new election confirming that parliamentary action took place
shortly thereafter. A dummy variable has been introduced to capture the effect of this
set of events on system satisfaction with the expectation that its impact will be positive.
The processes underlying the dynamics of both government and system
satisfaction are modelled as error-correction mechanisms. The general idea of such
a representation is that there is a dynamic equilibrium between a set of independent
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variables and the dependent variable, and because this equilibrium is in flux, and while
public opinion is not likely to adjust completely and immediately to exogenous changes,
the change in the dependent variable will not come about fully in a single period. In
addition, short term changes are a function not only of an adjustment to any
disequilibrium, and partially to recent changes in those variables that define the
equilibrium, but are also influenced by exogenous shocks. The general set-up of an
error-correction model is as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
or
(4)
The first equation defines the long-term coupling between the dependent variable (Y)
and the vector of independent variables (X). In the second equation, an identity, the
disequilibrium between the two is defined. The third equation specifies the dynamics
of the system with the first difference in the dependent variable responding both to
contemporaneous changes in the independent variables of the equilibrium equation
(the "short run effect" of those variables), exogenous shocks to system (the array S),
and the gap between the actual and equilibrium values of the dependent variable in
the last period (DISEQUIL) -- which captures the "feedback effect" of a system adjusting
to disequilibrium. The fourth equation is a single equation representation of the entire
system with the elements of equation 1 substituted into equation 3.18 It should be
pointed out that regardless of the specified effects of the exogenous variables, the error
correctionmodel isbuilt on theassumption that the adjustmentparameter, , is restricted
Yt - 1 = a i + B iXt - 1 + ei , t - 1
DISEQUILt - 1 = Yt - 1 - (a i + B iXt - 1) = ei , t - 1
D Yt = a j + B j D Xt + l DISEQUILt - 1 + B kSt + ej , t
D Yt = a k + B j D Xt + l( Yt - 1 - B iXt - 1) + B kSt + ej , t
l
18. Note that the constant, ai, from equation 1 is effectively weighted by the adjustment
parameter and included in ak of the fourth equation.
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to a range of values between -1 and 0. The size of the adjustment parameter specifies
the speed with which the dependent variable moves to close a gap in its actual level
and its moving equilibrium in a single period.
There is no consensus (cf., Beck, 1992, 1993; Durr, 1993; Smith, 1993) on whether
a two-stage estimation procedure (estimation of equations 1 and 3) or a single equation
estimation procedure (using equation 4 alone) is more appropriate (at least within the
context of non-cointegration as in the present case). Under some conditions, it can be
expected that the estimation results should be very similar. In light of this both sets of
estimations have been carried out. Note that the time span for the analysis extends
from the last half of 1977 through 1995. The temporal aggregation is semi-annual and
the observations are restricted in geographic scope to the area of West Germany, i.e.,
the territory of the Federal Republic prior to Reunification.
Both the government satisfaction and system satisfaction equations are specified
in detail below. Note that the variable acronyms are defined and the sources for the
data are listed in Table 33. First, with respect to government satisfaction, the moving
equilibrium is specified as a function of tax burden levels, economic growth, and an
ordinal variable capturing the putative effects of the electoral cycle. Other then the
adjustment to disequilibrium, short term influences include changes in the tax burden,
changes in the economic growth rate, and the two single period shocks associated with
Reunification. Second, the moving equilibrium of system satisfaction is specified as
being a function of the level of government satisfaction as well as the levels of
unemployment and inflation. Non-disequilibrium adjustment short term effects on
system satisfaction include changes in those three variables plus the dummy variable
capturing the change in government in the early 1980s.
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Government Satisfaction:
(5)
, where  is the predicated (6)
level of 
(7)
(8)
System Satisfaction:
(9)
, where  is the predicated (10)
level of 
(11)
(12)
As noted above, given the lack of consensus on the relative superiority of the
two-equation or one equation estimation procedures for an error correction model, both
have been estimated. The approach taken here in choosing from the results is on the
more conservative side; that is, the risk of a "Type-I" error (rejecting the hypothesis as
false when it is indeed true) is accepted in preference to a "Type-II" error (accepting
the hypothesis as true when it is indeed false). This entails treating as the definitive
estimation the one with the least successful results in terms of the parameter estimates
relative to the predictions of the model.
An examination of the estimation results, which are presented below, reveals that
in both instances the single equation procedure produces more disconfirming outcomes
GSATt - 1 = a 1 + b 1TAXBURt - 1 + b 2GROt - 1 + b 3ECYCLEt + e 1, t - 1
GSATDISt - 1 = GSATt - 1 - GSATt - 1 = e 1, t - 1 GSATt - 1
GSATt - 1
D GSATt = a 2 + b 4D TAXBURt + b 5D GROt + b 6UNIFPLUSt
+b 7UNIFMINt + l 1GSATDISt - 1 + e 2, t
D GSATt = a 3 + b 4D TAXBURt + b 5D GROt + b 6UNIFPLUSt + b 7UNIFMINt
+l 1(GSATt - 1 - (b 1TAXBURt - 1 + b 2GROt - 1 + b 3ECYCLEt)) + e 2, t
DSATt - 1 = a 4 + b 8GSATt - 1 + b 9UNEMPt - 1 + b 10INFLt - 1 + e 3, t - 1
DSATDISt - 1 = DSATt - 1 - DSATt - 1 = e 3, t - 1 DSATt - 1
DSATt - 1
D DSATt = a 5 + b 11D GSATt + b 12D UNEMPt + b 13D INFLt
+b 14GOV D t + l 2DSATDISt - 1 + e 4, t
D DSATt = a 6 + b 11D GSATt + b 12D UNEMPt + b 13D INFLt + b 14GOV D t
+l 2(DSATt - 1 - (b 8GSATt - 1 + b 9UNEMPt - 1 + b 10INFLt - 1)) + e 4, t
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and, therefore, is the least likely of the two procedures in the present case to lead to
"Type-II" errors. Nevertheless, most of the predictions are born out in these "weaker"
results. Attention is focused first on the government satisfaction estimates.19
Government Satisfaction -- Estimation Results:
(5’)
(7’)
Note: results reported are estimated with C-O, 2nd order autoregressive
error process
(8’)
Note: results reported are estimated with C-O, 2nd order autoregressive
error process
Note that the way in which equation 8’ is estimated requires that a transformation
based on the adjustment parameter, , needs to be made to the estimated parameters
for the three levels variables. The actual parameter then for is -2.56, that
for is 2.07, and that for is 4.04. , the adjustment parameter, is
statistically significant and takes on the negative value predicted. The implications of
the size of the estimated parameter is that the one-period adjustment to a gap between
the level of government satisfaction and the moving equilibrium eliminates slightly more
than half of the discrepancy. All three of the parameters for the variables that define
GSATt - 1 = 63.35
(23.05)**
- 3.38
(- 6.82)**
TAXBURt - 1 + 2.38
(3.94)**
GROt - 1 + 2.43
(2.81)**
ECYCLEt
R2 = .66, d = 1.29, r 1 = .28, n = 37
D GSATt = .44(0.42)
- 1.57
(- 4.47)**
D TAXBURt + .79
(2.68)**
D GROt + 5.13
(2.08)**
UNIFPLUSt
- 9.33
(- 3.93)**
UNIFMINt - .64
(- 5.45)**
GSATDISt - 1
R2 = .73, d = 1.82, r 1 = - .11, n = 37
D GSATt = 35.80
(3.67)**
- 1.15
(- 2.39)**
D TAXBURt + .59(1.43)D GROt + 4.83(1.91)*
UNIFPLUSt - 9.65
(- 3.84)**
UNIFMINt
- .55
(- 3.53)**
GSATt - 1 - 1.41
(- 1.95)*
TAXBURt - 1 + 1.14
(1.82)*
GROt - 1 + 2.22
(3.74)**
ECYCLEt
R2 = .73, d = 1.82, r 1 = - .03, n = 37
l
TAXBUR(t - 1)
GRO(t - 1) ECYCLEt l
19. Unless otherwise noted, all equations were estimated with OLS. Only those
equations where the estimation results indicated autocorrelation problems with the error
terms were subject to further analyses. The Cochrane-Orcutt (C-O) method was
employed in these instances.
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the equilibrium are statistically significant, though that for the economic growth term is
only weakly so (at the .10 level), and take on the predicted signs. Higher tax burdens
lower the equilibrium government satisfaction level, higher growth increases the level,
and the equilibrium follows a cyclical path between elections, first declining and then
increasing. The immediate response to changes in the tax burden is such that an
increase in this burden cuts satisfaction with government. The parameter for the change
in the economic growth rate variable takes on the predicted positive sign; however, it
is statistically insignificant. Finally, the two Reunification-related variables have the
expected impact, initially increasing government satisfaction with the events of late
1989, and then even more substantially decreasing satisfaction with government once
Reunification was brought about and the first all-German federal elections had taken
place. The econometric results dealing with system satisfaction are dealt with next.
System Satisfaction - Estimation Results:
(9’)
(11’)
(12’)
Again, the single equation estimation results (12’) for the three exogenous levels
variables need to be converted in light of the adjustment parameter. This means that
DSATt - 1 = 60.76
(8.25)**
+ .44
(6.36)**
GSATt - 1 - 1.23
(- 2.60)**
UNEMPt - 1 - 1.85
(- 3.90)**
INFLt - 1
R2 = .76, d = 1.43, r 1 = .25, n = 37
D DSATt = - .36(- 0.78)
+ .50
(6.21)**
D GSATt - 2.27
(- 3.35)**
D UNEMPt - 1.77
(- 2.67)**
D INFLt
+11.94
(4.09)**
GOV D t - .60
(- 4.28)**
DSATDISt - 1
R2 = .76, d = 2.18, r 1 = - .09, n = 37
D DSATt = 37.37
(3.48)**
+ .49
(5.45)**
D GSATt - 2.34
(- 2.90)**
D UNEMPt - 1.69
(- 2.07)**
D INFLt + 11.98
(3.68)**
GOV D t
- .60
(- 4.03)**
DSATt - 1 + .24
(2.59)**
GSATt - 1 - .74(- 1.60)
UNEMPt - 1 - 1.12
(- 2.10)**
INFLt - 1
R2 = .76, d = 2.23, r 1 = - .11, n = 37
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the actual parameter on is .40, that on is -1.23, and that for
is -1.86. Unlike what was found in the government satisfaction estimation results, the
values of all of the parameters that derive from the two different techniques are very
similar, though in the case of the single equation estimation, one of the parameter
estimates (that related to the levels of the lagged value of unemployment) loses the
statistical significance it had in the two-equation estimation procedure.20 The size of
the estimated adjustment parameter implies that approximately 60 percent of the
discrepancy between the prevailing level of system satisfaction and the moving
equilibrium is eliminated in one period -- only marginally faster than the adjustment rate
found in the government satisfaction equation. The parameters of the three levels
variables that define the equilibrium value of system satisfaction all take on the predicted
signs, but only two of the three, those for government satisfaction and for inflation, are
statistically significant. Implied by these two statistically significant parameters is the
following: each percent of consumer price inflation lowers the system satisfaction
equilibrium level by nearly 2 percent; for every percent level of government satisfaction,
the system satisfaction equilibrium level is increased by a quarter of a percent. In the
short-term, however, it is clear that system satisfaction responds very sensitively to
unemployment. Each percentage increase in unemployment entails about a 2.3 percent
decrease in system satisfaction within a period. Short term responses to changes in
inflation and satisfaction with government are also powerful. Each percent increase in
the rate of inflation lowers system satisfaction levels by about 1.7 percent. For every
percent increase in satisfaction with government, the short term response in system
satisfaction is to increase by about a half a percentage point. Note as well that the
change in the governing coalition in the early 1980s had a powerful impact on system
satisfaction -- increasing it by approximately 12 percentage points.
GSATt - 1 UNEMPt - 1 INFLt - 1
20. This similarity in parameter estimates derives from the lack of autocorrelation
problems associated with the error terms in these sets of estimates.
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This analysis of the West German experience over the last twenty years suggests
some important features of this systemthat need to berecognized in light of its continuing
economic and political difficulties. First, while the general performance of the economy,
major shocks to the system, and the electoral cycle all influence satisfaction with
government performance, the policies of government itself are also critical in shaping
citizens’ evaluations of its performance. In particular, the increasingly heavy tax burden
that the government has imposed on the average worker has greatly undermined
satisfaction with its performance. Second, popular satisfaction with the performance
of authorities and the system are linked. Nearly a half century old, the system has
served its citizenry well. Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with an incumbent government
can work to undermine satisfaction with the regime itself. However, even while poor
governmental performance can undermine satisfaction with the overall system, the
latter can be regenerated through the replacement of an unpopular government. Third,
even in a well-established, highly-legitimated political system, economic conditions
influence the levels of satisfaction with the overall system and prolonged economic
misery will seriously undermine the levels of satisfaction and may thereby bring about
a situation where it might be rational to call its legitimacy into question.21
East Germany Since Reunification
An analysis of the East German case requires a different research strategy. This
latter entails employing a relatively simple formulation that attempts to account for the
movement in satisfaction with government performance on the basis of citizens’
subjective evaluations of economic conditions and the government’s efforts to facilitate
21. The concept of rational legitimacy was developed by Rogowski (1974). It holds
that not only are utilities and disutilities associated with the prevailing regime structure
determinant of rationally based acceptance or rejection of its legitimacy, but that the
belief that an alternative and workable regime might be put into its place also needs to
be incorporated within the calculus.
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a higher standard of living within the region. This strategy is dictated by practical and
substantive considerations. First, in the case of East Germany the relatively short period
of time since Reunification greatly restricts the degrees of freedom available, and
problems with the reliability of data (e.g., the unemployment rate which masks a large
amount of hidden unemployment) prohibit one from employing the same model used
to account for the dynamics of government and system satisfaction within the West.
Second, as demonstrated earlier, the willingness and/or ability of the population in this
region to distinguish between authorities and regime is very minimal. Movements in
the one series correspond very closely to movements in the other series and therefore
an explanation of the dynamics of one effectively constitutes an explanation of the
dynamics of the other.
A number of analysts have been prone to dismiss the importance of economically
based explanations for the levels of dissatisfaction with the political system that prevail
in the East (cf., Weil, 1993; Nolle-Neumann, 1994; Wiesenthal, 1996). However, the
analysis of the West German experience reported above certainly sustains the basic
position that economic performance is an important source of both government and
regime satisfaction in that region. Why then should this not be the case for citizens in
the East? Here there was no deep-rooted commitment to that system. Rather, the
affluence of the West was a major attraction to the citizens of the GDR as their system
collapsed and the fundamental question at issue was whether to join the Federal
Republic or seek a "third way." East Germans expected living conditions to improve
significantly by joining the West. That they have suffered significant economic problems
that they had not anticipated is now widely recognized. Furthermore, while system
satisfaction levels have moved up and down in both East and West, there has been a
consistently large gap between the two regions on this dimension. . On average, since
unification, the Eastern level of satisfaction with system performance have been about
two-thirds the level found in the West. Correspondingly, the standard of living, wages,
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and many other measures of economic performance in the East approximate two-thirds
the levels of those in the West. There is no denying the importance of socialization
and the values that have been imparted through that process. Nevertheless, if people
make a decision clearly based on economic conditions to opt for one system over
another and then come to be disappointed with the economic consequences of that
decision, it seems somewhat misguided to seek elsewhere for an explanation of their
dissatisfaction with that system.
The equation used to account for the dynamics of satisfaction with government
performance in the East since Reunification is relatively simple and focuses on
government efforts in the economic area and the performance of the economy in the
region. Both variables are based on public opinion data. The first variable ( )
deals with people’s assessments of the efforts of the Federal government to raise
Eastern living standards to thoseof the West. As incorporated in the regression equation
(13) it measures the percentage share of the population in the East that believes the
Bonn government was not doing enough to equalize living standards and the
expectation is that this is negatively related to satisfaction with overall government
performance. The second variable ( ) is a sociotropic measure of prospective
economic conditions. It is based on people’s expectations regarding the economic
situation in the East in the next year and includes the percentage share of the population
that expects the Eastern economy would improve. This variable should be positively
related to satisfaction with government performance in equation 13.
(13)
Based on quarterly data for the period from 1991.1 through 1995.4 (n=20), the
regressions estimate for this equation is provided below.
BONNt
ECONt
GSATt = a 7 + b 15BONNt + b 16ECONt + e5, t
44 On the Road to Weimar?
(13’)
, d = 1.61,  = .18, OLS.
The fit of this equation to the data is quite good and the expectations regarding the
effects of the independent variables on satisfaction with government performance are
supported. Thus, satisfaction levels drop as the public perceives that the government
in Bonn is not doing enough to equalize living standards (a one percent increase in the
independent variable leading to about a .4 percent decrease in satisfaction).
Simultaneously, as optimism with respect to prospective economic performance in the
region increases, so too does satisfaction with government performance, with each
percent increase in the former leading to a .7 percent increase in the latter. These
results (plus those reported earlier) strongly support the position that in East Germany,
as in the West, economic conditions and government policies strongly influence
satisfaction with government performance and the latter, even more firmly than in the
West, has a strong impact on satisfaction with the Federal Republic’s political regime.
Conclusion
Reunification has come at a cost to the German political system. East Germans
continue to be disappointed in its performance. In the West, once high levels of
satisfaction with its performance have disappeared and disappointment has grown. In
both regions the combination of poor economic performance and disappointment with
the government in power have fuelled this loss in confidence.
What of the future? In terms of both economic prospects and government policy,
it appears to be rather bleak. Caught in a web of its own making, the commitment to
meeting the criteria for the EMU, the German economic system is floundering.
Restrictive monetary policy combined with a very stringent fiscal policy will continue to
GSATt = 46.79
(4.62)**
- .37
(- 3.07)**
BONNt + .70
(7.28)**
ECONt
R2 = .80, r
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dampen the prospects for significant growth and a reduction in a ballooning
unemployment rate (Carlin and Soskice, 1997). Slow growth in the overall economy
is expected to continue and there are strong reasons to believe that the process of
convergence between East and West has halted.22 Simultaneously, the effects of the
government’s plans to change the tax system, should they be implemented, are most
likely to undermine citizens’ evaluations of both its and the political system’s
performance. Targeted mainly at relieving the tax burdens of the well-to-do, and prone
to increase the tax burdens of average workers, the reforms will help to further erode
satisfaction with the political system.
Is Germany on the road to Weimar? There are few trustworthy maps and
compasses that aid one in plotting the course of a political system. But certainly the
low levels of popular confidence in this system do not bode well for its future. In the
East, little progress in solidifying confidence for the Federal Republic’s political system
has been made. Simultaneously, the costs of Germany’s two major projects,
Reunification and the deepening of ties with the European Union, have eroded
confidence in the West. Clearly the road to Weimar is a long one where a number of
other conditions will have to be met before a similar collapse could come about. Still,
it is probably not an exaggeration to say that the system is confronting a major challenge
and formidable change is needed. No system will collapse from the loss of confidence
alone. A viable alternative needs to be in sight (Rogowski, 1974). At least in West
Germany the overwhelming majority still prefer their political system over all others and
thereby see no viable alternative.23 But this does not prevent one or another political
22. These forecasts are contained in the spring report of the six leading German
economic research institutes as described in The Financial Times, April 23, 1997, p.2.
23. Note that in 1994 74 percent of West Germans held the view that the Federal
Republic’s system of democracy was the best form of government available, 15 percent
were undecided, and 9 percent thought there was a better form. In the East only 31
percent thought the present form was the best, 41 percent were undecided and 28
percent held that there was a better form. These figures are drawn from Noell-Neumann
(1994).
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entrepreneur from emerging with an attractive but anti-democratic vision of an
alternative system. Such an entrepreneur might easily gather support from the many
who are disenchanted with the performance of the present system.
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Table 1
East and West German Citizens’ Ranking of Important
Problems and Goals at Around the Time of the
Reunification Treaty Signing (May-June, 1990)
East West
% Saying % Saying
Rank Very Rank Very
Important Important
1 Fighting Drug Business 82.4 1 Fighting Crime 76.7
2 Insuring a Stable Economy 81.9 2 Workable Environmental Protection 74.2
3 Securing Pension System 81.4 3 Fighting Drug Business 69.0
4 Workable Environmental Protection 78.7 4 Securing Pension System 68.5
5 Fighting Crime 76.7 5 Creating More Jobs 63.2
6 Creating More Jobs 68.3 6 Improving Housing Market Situation 62.8
7 Improving Housing Market Situation 59.4 7 Insuring a Stable Economy 57.9
8 Reducing Bureaucracy 54.1 8 Doing More for Women 33.9
9 Realizing German Unification 50.9 9 Reducing Bureaucracy 32.1
10 Creaing a United Europe 37.0 10 Realizing German Unification 28.4
11 Doing More for Women 36.9 11 Creaing a United Europe 26.5
Preventing Misuse of Asylum Rights 51.9
Integrating Refugees from Eastern 18.8
Europe/Soviet Union
Sources:
IPOS, East, 1990; IPOS, West, 1990.
Here is a list of tasks and goals that are discussed in [the Federal Republicof Germany / the German Democratic Republic]. Please
tell us which of these you personally see as very important, important, not so important and completely unimportant.
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Table 2
Popular Opinion on Reunification in May of 1990
in the Two German States
East West
For unification 94.2 76.3
Against Unification 3.2 9.1
Indifferent 2.7 14.6
Popular Opinion on Reunification and Its Timing in May of 1990
in the Two German States
Opposed Indifferent Supported, Supported and
but not for immediate
immediately or quick
unification
East 3.2  2.6 55.1 39.4
West 9.1 14.6 51.5 24.8
Are you personally for the Unification of both German states (1), are you againt the
Unification (2) , or are you indifferent to Unification (3)?
In the case where the respondent is for unification of both states: Should it occur quickly
or should one take take time?
East West
(of the (of the
94.2 %) 76.3%)
Quickly 41.8 32.5
Take one’s time 58.5 67.5
Sources:
IPOS, East, 1990; IPOS, West, 1990.
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Table 3
Popular Expectations About the Advantages
and Disadvatages of Reunification
East West
Reunification would bring:
Mainly advantages 63.5 28.3
Mainly disadvantages  5.9 24.1
Advantages and disadvantages that would 30.6 47.3
cancel each other out.
Sources:
IPOS, East, 1990; IPOS, West, 1990.
East: In the long run do you believe that the Unification of both German states will bring
the people of the [German Democratic Republic / Federal Republic of Germany] mainly
advantages (1), mainly disadvantages (2), or that the advantages and disadvantages
would cancel each other out (3)?
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Table 4
Expectations About When Parity in Living Standards Would Occur
Expected
Year:
Don’t know Until 1995 From 1996 to From 2001 to 2006 or later
2000 2005
East:
In 1990 68.2 -- 25.9 4.1 1.8
In 1992 1.0 2.1 29.6 46.6 22.2
In 1995 0.8 --** 15.9 50.3 33.0
West:
In 1990 1.0 30.3 46.2 12.4 10.1
In 1992 2.3 3.4* 28.8 45.5 20.1
In 1995 3.3 --** 38.2 39.8 18.7
Values have been calculated on the basis of the year of the survey and the number of
years it was expected that parity would be reached.
* - In this year approximately .2% of the sample in the West stated that they believed
it had already occurred (these are included in the category "Until 1995").
** - An unspecified percentage of the sample apparently stated that they believed it had
already occurred (these are included in the category "Until 2000").
Data on the following come from the the IPOS studies in 1990, and three Politbarometer
surveys in 1992 and 1995. The values given for 1992 are the averages from two
surveys, one in June and the other in November. The 1995 survey took place in May.
Parity Achieved?
East West
Already achieved  9.3 28.9
Not achieved 90.7 71.1
Source: 1994 Politbarometer (February)
And how is it with equalization of living standards between the East and the West: is it
to a great extent already achieved or is it not yet achieved?
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Figure 4
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Table 5
Developments in Disposable Income per Household
Within the Two Regions of Germany
Nominal:
East West East as %
of West
1990 1765 3626 49
1991 2173 3700 59
1992 2529 3924 64
1993 2957 4033 73
1994 3216 4190 77
Equivalent Income (nominal):
East West East as %
of West
1990  727 1580 46
1991  872 1632 53
1992 1066 1715 62
1993 1250 1805 69
1994 1376 1888 73
Income Distribution: Gini index
East West
1990 0.184 0.264
1991 0.192 0.259
1992 0.195 0.261
1993 0.208 0.270
1994 0.217 ---
Source: DIW (1994) "Die Einkommen in Ostdeutschland steigen weiter -
auch die Einkommensarmut nimmt wieder zu," DIW Wochenbericht 51-52: p. 868.
Based on SOEP.
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Table 6
Public Sector Financial Transfers from West to East Germany
(Net Transfers = Gross Transfers - Receipts)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Total Total Total col. (3) col. (3) (3) as
Net Net Net as Share as Share Share of
Transfers Transfers Transfers of Total of West East
(Bills. DM, (Bills. DM, Per German German German
Nominal) 91 Prices) Capita GDP GDP GDP
(DM, 91 (%) (%) (%)
Prices)
1991 106 106 6713 3.7 4.0 51.5
1992 115 109 6949 3.7 4.1 43.8
1993 129 118 7559 4.1 4.5 41.8
1994 126 113 7296 3.8 4.2 36.3
1995 150 131 8456 4.3 4.9 39.9
Sources: Transfer data: OECD Economic Survey, Germany, 1995;
Population and GDP data from Tabellensammlung; Price data from Stat. Bundesamt.
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Figure 8
Figure 9
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Table 7
Dissatisfaction with Bonn Government’s Efforts at
Improving Living Standards in the East
Percent Saying too
little or not engough
in:
East West
1991.1 85.2 42.3
1991.2 78.9 31.8
1991.3 79.0 25.3
1991.4 78.6 24.2
1992.1 80.1 27.0
1992.2 83.3 28.3
1992.3 82.8 31.7
1992.4 82.5 30.6
1993.1 83.8 31.5
1993.2 81.6 29.5
1993.3 79.0 27.5
1993.4 76.5 28.2
1994.1 74.1 28.2
1994.2 78.3 22.5
1994.3 74.3 20.8
1994.4 74.9 20.0
1995.1 75.2 18.5
1995.2 72.2 14.6
1995.3 63.1 14.7
1995.4 55.5 14.3
Is the Federal Government in Bonn making sufficient effort to bring Eastern living
standards up to the level of the West?
Source: Politbarometer: Quarterly Averages of those saying effort insufficient.
Data based on responses to two similar questions:
What is your opinion: does the Federal Government in Bonn do (1) too much, (2) too
little, or (3) just the right amount to bring Eastern living standards up to those of the
West?
Do you thing that the Federal Government does (1) enough or (2) not enough to bring
Eastern living standards up to those of the West?
Percentages based on valid answers (1-3 and 1-2, respectively) only; missing values
excluded from calculation.
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Table 8
Easterners‘ Dissatisfaction with What Is Being Done to Bring
Eastern Living Standards Up to the West and Westerners’ Belief
that the Dissatisfaction is Warranted
Quarterly averages
East West
Percent Percent Seeing
Expressing Dissatisfaction
Dissatisfaction as Justified
1991.1 79.4 41.4
1991.2 72.6 34.1
1991.3 71.0 31.3
1991.4 70.7 28.4
1992.1 71.8 32.6
1992.2 74.5 33.6
1992.3 71.2 33.2
1992.4 73.9 32.1
1993.1 72.5 33.6
1993.2 70.1 33.2
1993.3 70.0 33.5
1993.4 67.8 34.0
1994.1 64.5 35.5
1994.2 65.8 31.0
1994.3 61.5 29.8
1994.4 64.0 29.7
1995.1 65.8 26.0
1995.2 63.8 24.9
1995.3 54.0 23.9
1995.4 34.0 21.0
Source: Politbarometer
The question posed in the East was "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with what has
been done to bring living standards up to those of the West."
The question posed in the West was "Many East Germans are unsatisfied with whata
has been don to improve their living standards. Is that justified or not justified?"
Note that percentages based on valid responses (1-2) only; missing data excluded from
calculation.
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Table 9
A Comparison of Easterners‘ and Westerners‘ Views
on the Importance of Achieving Equality in Living Standards
East West
1991 83.2 34.8
1992 79.3 31.6
1993 75.4 29.1
1995 71.7 24.9
Source: IPOS
Percent Saying this is a very important goal.
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Table 10
A Comparison of Easterners‘ and Westerners‘ Views
on How Well Reunification is Going
East West
1. Better 2. Worse 3. As 1. Better 2.Worse 3. As
Expected Expected
1990.3 21.4 44.8 34.2 19.9 43.4 36.6
1990.4 31.5 26.6 41.9 37.5 20.6 42.0
1991.1  8.7 64.1 27.1 --- --- ---
1991.2 11.8 47.2 41.0  6.7 44.3 49.0
1991.3 14.7 44.0 41.4 11.5 43.7 45.0
1991.4 14.8 40.5 44.7 13.6 38.3 48.1
1992.1 16.8 43.8 39.5 11.9 43.0 45.1
1992.2 12.3 49.6 38.2  8.0 49.4 42.6
1992.3 12.3 51.6 36.2  6.6 50.3 43.2
1992.4 11.6 52.4 36.0  6.6 52.6 40.8
1993.1  9.5 54.3 36.3  5.6 53.9 40.5
1993.2 12.0 58.9 29.1  7.6 55.6 36.8
1993.3 11.4 53.4 35.2  5.7 53.3 41.1
1993.4 11.7 51.1 37.2  8.9 51.7 39.5
1994.1 10.6 54.8 34.5 10.7 47.6 41.7
1994.2 12.0 49.4 38.6 14.5 41.6 43.9
1994.3 16.2 46.4 37.4 17.6 40.8 41.6
1994.4 16.6 45.6 37.9 19.0 42.7 38.3
1995.1 17.8 48.1 34.1 15.9 43.3 40.9
1995.2 16.3 47.2 36.4 22.1 40.7 37.1
1995.3 25.3 38.5 36.2 19.9 39.7 40.4
1995.4 21.9 36.9 41.2 17.8 43.0 39.2
Quarterly Averages
Source: Politbarometer
All in all, the Unification of Germany is going:
1. Mainly better than I thought it would
2. Mainly worse than I thought it would
3. About as expected
9. No answer
percentages based on valid answers (1-3) only; NA excluded
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Table 11
Easterners‘ Expectations about Reunification’s
Effect on Their Personal Situations: Fulfilled
or Not Fulfilled
East
Fulfilled Not
Fulfilled
1991.1 37.1 62.9
1991.2 46.8 53.2
1991.3 49.6 33.6
1991.4 52.6 47.4
1992.1 51.9 48.1
1992.2 50.3 49.7
1992.3 47.7 52.4
1992.4 47.3 52.7
1993.1 45.8 54.3
1993.2 46.7 53.3
1993.3 51.2 48.8
1993.4 50.0 50.0
1994.1 37.9 62.1
1994.2 51.4 48.6
1994.3 53.2 46.8
1994.4 50.1 49.9
1995.1 --- ---
1995.2 --- ---
1995.3 69.2 30.8
1995.4 68.8 31.2
Source: Politbarometer
Quarterly Averages
If you think about your personal situation, have your expectations about Unification to
this point (1) mainly been fulfilled, or mainly not been fulfilled?
1. Mainly fulfilled
2. Mainly not fulfilled
9. No answer
percentages based only on 1 and 2 (9:NA ignored)
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Table 12
Easterners‘ Judgements about the Present
Economic Situation in East Germany*
East
Year/ Good Mixed Bad
Quarter
1990.3 2.5 21.8 76.7
1990.4 2.2 26.4 71.4
1991.1 1.6 23.4 75.0
1991.2 2.0 25.6 72.4
1991.3 2.8 39.9 57.4
1991.4 3.1 41.6 55.3
1992.1 2.5 40.4 57.0
1992.2 2.3 38.5 59.1
1992.3 2.4 33.5 64.1
1992.4 2.3 34.7 63.1
1993.1 1.8 35.9 62.3
1993.2 1.8 37.6 60.6
1993.3 2.1 37.2 60.8
1993.4 2.2 38.5 59.2
1994.1 2.6 43.3 54.1
1994.2 3.9 48.9 47.2
1994.3 5.1 55.4 39.6
1994.4 5.6 59.6 34.8
1995.1 5.9 58.6 35.5
1995.2 5.9 59.2 34.9
1995.3 9.4 56.9 33.7
1995.4 12.6 53.0 33.8
1996.1* 9.2 53.1 37.6
1996.2* 9.3 54.8 35.9
1996.3* --- --- ---
1996.4* 9.3 54.0 37.2
Source: Politbarometer
Quarterly Averages
How would you judge the present economic situation in East Germany (i.e., the [former]
GDR) to be? Is it (1) good, (2) partly good and partly bad (mixed) , or (3) bad (9=NA).
percentages based only on 1,2, and 3 (9:NA ignored)
*
-- Note: Data for 1996 deal with a question where the reference is not to East Germany
but to Germany (as a whole).
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Table 13
Easterners‘ Judgements about the Next Year’s
Economic Situation in East Germany*
East
Better Same Worse
1990.3 58.4 27.2 14.4
1990.4 56.3 30.8 12.8
1991.1 44.7 36.5 18.8
1991.2 45.3 39.8 14.9
1991.3 52.6 35.8 11.7
1991.4 48.8 41.3 9.9
1992.1 42.1 46.0 11.8
1992.2 32.4 51.3 16.2
1992.3 27.8 51.5 20.7
1992.4 25.0 55.3 19.8
1993.1 20.0 56.2 23.7
1993.2 24.4 54.4 21.3
1993.3 21.8 54.7 23.7
1993.4 23.0 52.0 25.0
1994.1 26.4 53.6 20.0
1994.2 30.9 55.6 13.5
1994.3 36.9 53.0 10.2
1994.4 36.5 53.7 9.8
1995.1 33.3 55.3 11.4
1995.2 31.2 56.5 12.2
1995.3 35.4 48.3 16.2
1995.4 38.6 42.7 17.4
1996.1* 22.8 37.7 38.4
1996.2* 28.0 38.6 33.5
1996.3* --- --- ---
1996.4* 18.6 38.9 42.5
Source: Politbarometer
Quarterly Averages
And what do you think the general economic situation in East Germany will be in a
year’s time. Do you expect that it will be (1) better, (2) the same as now, (3) or worse
(9=NA).
Percentages based only on 1,2, and 3 (9:NA ignored).
*
-- Note: Data for 1996 deal with a question where the reference is not to East Germany
but to Germany (as a whole).
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Table 14
Easterners‘ Judgements about Their
Own Personal Economic Situation at Present
East
Good Mixed Bad
1991.1 25.0 54.7 20.3
1991.2 27.3 56.4 16.3
1991.3 28.8 55.7 15.6
1991.4 30.5 55.2 14.3
1992.1 34.5 54.3 11.1
1992.2 31.8 53.2 15.0
1992.3 33.4 53.5 13.2
1992.4 35.0 52.8 12.3
1993.1 32.1 53.7 14.1
1993.2 37.3 50.0 12.6
1993.3 37.0 50.0 13.1
1993.4 37.6 50.2 12.2
1994.1 37.4 48.6 14.0
1994.2 37.5 48.7 13.8
1994.3 40.7 46.8 12.6
1994.4 39.7 49.5 10.8
1995.1 39.1 47.9 13.0
1995.2 38.2 49.3 12.6
1995.3 48.0 42.2 9.7
1995.4 54.5 35.9 9.2
1996.1 42.0 44.9 12.7
1996.2 45.1 43.1 11.1
1996.3 --- --- ---
1996.4 43.5 44.6 11.9
Source: Politbarometer
Quarterly Averages
How would you judge your present economic situation to be? Is it (1) good, (2) partly
good and partly bad (mixed), or (3) bad (9=NA).
Percentages based only on 1,2, and 3 (9: NA ignored)
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Table 15
Easterners‘ Judgements about Their
Own Personal Economic Situation in the Coming Year
East
Better Same Worse
1990.2 51.6 33.8 14.7
1990.3 51.6 35.6 12.8
1990.4 --- --- ---
1991.1 36.6 43.2 19.9
1991.2 39.9 45.3 14.8
1991.3 38.7 46.6 14.7
1991.4 41.0 49.2 9.8
1992.1 36.5 54.9 8.5
1992.2 30.8 57.0 12.2
1992.3 26.1 59.0 15.0
1992.4 24.4 62.4 13.1
1993.1 21.6 64.9 13.4
1993.2 24.1 64.6 11.3
1993.3 20.1 65.9 14.1
1993.4 18.9 66.4 14.7
1994.1 19.5 66.3 14.1
1994.2 20.4 67.5 12.1
1994.3 24.0 66.8 9.2
1994.4 22.2 67.4 10.4
1995.1 20.5 67.1 12.5
1995.2 20.5 67.8 11.7
1995.3 23.3 64.6 11.9
1995.4 27.9 57.8 11.6
1996.1 19.9 59.0 18.2
1996.2 23.1 60.9 16.0
1996.3 --- --- ---
1996.4 20.7 60.0 15.4
Source: Politbarometer
Quarterly Averages
What do you think your economic situation will be in a year’s time. Do you expect that
it will be (1) better, (2) the same as now, (3) or worse (9=NA).
Percentages based only on 1,2, and 3 (9:NA ignored)
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Table 16
West German Economic Situation at
Present; Westerners’ Views: Annual and
Quarterly Averages*
Year/ Good Mixed Bad
Quarter
1977 27.8 56.2 16.0
1978 29.1 56.1 14.8
1979 53.8 40.6 5.7
1980 45.8 45.5 8.8
1981 19.9 52.4 27.8
1982 10.6 48.5 39.5
1983 14.3 54.4 31.5
1984 19.1 54.9 25.9
1985 22.7 53.9 23.4
1986 48.1 45.0 6.9
1987 35.6 51.1 13.3
1988 41.2 49.6 9.2
1989 54.5 39.2 6.3
1990 66.6 29.8 3.6
1991.1 74.1 22.3 3.7
1991.2 67.4 27.5 5.0
1991.3 51.3 38.2 10.5
1991.4 52.7 38.1 9.2
1992.1 40.9 47.2 11.9
1992.2 39.2 49.5 11.3
1992.3 33.3 52.0 14.7
1992.4 18.8 54.5 26.8
1993.1 14.6 57.8 27.5
1993.2 17.5 53.8 28.7
1993.3 8.2 56.4 35.4
1993.4 8.4 52.1 39.5
1994.1 10.0 55.8 34.2
1994.2 17.5 59.4 23.2
1994.3 19.4 63.7 16.9
1994.4 24.5 60.4 15.1
1995.1 23.4 63.4 13.2
1995.2 26.8 62.1 11.1
1995.3 24.9 60.9 14.2
1995.4 26.0 56.1 17.8
1996.1* 8.1 54.1 37.9
1996.2* 9.2 53.5 37.4
1996.3* --- --- ---
1996.4* 9.2 55.7 34.8
Source: Politbarometer
Missings (9) not included in base for percentages
*
-- Note: Data for 1996 deal with a question where the reference is not to West Germany
but to Germany (as a whole).
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Table 17
West German Economic Situation in the
Next Year; Westerners’ Views: Annual
and Quarterly Averages*
Year/ Better Same Worse
Quarter
1977 14.5 67.1 18.4
1978 21.6 58.9 19.6
1979 19.2 61.0 19.8
1980 12.6 58.1 29.3
1981 10.6 43.5 46.1
1982 16.9 46.2 37.0
1983 28.4 52.0 19.7
1984 24.4 54.4 21.2
1985 24.7 56.5 19.0
1986 28.5 63.4 8.1
1987 15.8 61.9 22.4
1988 13.3 59.2 27.5
1989 18.8 60.9 20.3
1990 22.2 43.9 34.0
1991.1 16.7 50.4 32.9
1991.2 18.3 51.1 30.6
1991.3 15.1 45.3 39.7
1991.4 13.7 47.0 39.2
1992.1 12.7 40.5 46.8
1992.2 14.3 44.1 41.6
1992.3 11.2 37.3 51.5
1992.4 12.7 31.7 55.6
1993.1 17.2 32.7 50.1
1993.2 22.2 36.8 41.0
1993.3 25.9 35.1 39.0
1993.4 28.3 38.1 33.6
1994.1 32.8 37.7 29.5
1994.2 42.7 37.0 20.5
1994.3 42.7 40.5 16.9
1994.4 42.0 40.7 17.2
1995.1 38.9 42.9 18.3
1995.2 28.6 48.3 23.0
1995.3 23.1 48.2 28.7
1995.4 15.9 46.6 37.5
1996.1* 15.6 37.3 47.1
1996.2* 20.2 40.3 39.5
1996.3* --- --- ---
1996.4* 18.6 36.3 43.1
Source: Politbarometer
Missings (9) not included in base for percentages
*
-- Note: Data for 1996 deal with a question where the reference is not to West Germany
but to Germany (as a whole).
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Table 18
Westerners’ Judgements about their Own
Personal Economic Situation at Present:
Annual and Quarterly  Averages
Year/ Good Mixed Bad
Quarter
1977 54.7 38.8 6.5
1978 --- --- ---
1979 65.4 29.8 4.8
1980 --- --- ---
1981 49.2 40.0 10.8
1982 43.6 43.9 12.5
1983 40.5 46.7 12.9
1984 44.0 43.7 12.3
1985 47.4 43.0 9.6
1986 53.0 38.8 8.4
1987 51.3 40.1 8.6
1988 60.7 32.7 6.7
1989 59.6 33.8 6.7
1990 64.4 30.2 5.4
1991.1 68.4 26.0 5.6
1991.2 63.1 31.4 5.5
1991.3 60.9 31.5 7.6
1991.4 58.4 34.2 7.4
1992.1 54.4 38.2 7.4
1992.2 55.6 35.7 8.7
1992.3 58.7 33.1 8.3
1992.4 58.5 33.7 7.9
1993.1 55.2 36.1 8.7
1993.2 56.7 36.6 6.7
1993.3 55.6 35.0 9.4
1993.4 55.1 35.9 9.0
1994.1 54.1 36.1 9.8
1994.2 55.5 35.8 8.7
1994.3 54.3 37.2 8.6
1994.4 57.0 34.3 8.8
1995.1 51.8 40.4 7.6
1995.2 56.2 35.1 8.7
1995.3 56.1 35.4 8.4
1995.4 51.1 37.8 11.0
1996.1 53.1 38.8 8.5
1996.2 52.3 38.6 9.1
1996.3 --- --- ---
1996.4 50.6 39.1 9.9
Source: Politbarometer
Missings (9) not included in base for percentages
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Table 19
Westerners’ Judgements about their Own
Personal Economic Situation in the Next
Year: Annual and Quarterly Averages
Year/ Better Same Worse
Quarter
1977 13.8 76.8 9.5
1978 --- --- ---
1979 18.5 72.2 9.4
1980 --- --- ---
1981 9.2 66.0 24.9
1982 10.3 66.3 23.6
1983 15.4 70.1 14.6
1984 14.3 72.3 13.4
1985 16.6 76.3 7.1
1986 17.1 76.7 6.2
1987 16.8 74.0 9.3
1988 20.4 65.1 14.5
1989 21.1 69.1 9.9
1990 21.4 63.9 14.7
1991.1 22.5 64.6 13.0
1991.2 20.0 61.5 18.5
1991.3 21.6 58.1 20.3
1991.4 20.4 62.8 16.8
1992.1 18.7 61.6 19.7
1992.2 18.3 62.0 19.7
1992.3 15.6 62.4 22.0
1992.4 14.8 61.2 24.0
1993.1 18.5 59.3 22.2
1993.2 19.4 66.0 14.6
1993.3 18.4 59.8 21.9
1993.4 17.2 63.4 19.8
1994.1 17.8 63.6 18.6
1994.2 22.7 62.4 15.0
1994.3 22.8 64.2 13.0
1994.4 22.8 62.3 14.9
1995.1 20.4 63.4 14.7
1995.2 19.3 65.0 15.7
1995.3 19.0 66.0 15.0
1995.4 16.6 58.7 24.7
1996.1 13.2 63.1 23.6
1996.2 16.3 64.6 19.0
1996.3 --- --- ---
1996.4 16.2 58.3 24.1
Source: Politbarometer
Missings (9) not included in base for percentages
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Table 20
Easterners‘ Views on Present Situation
In Comparison with Before the Wende
East Present
Situation Ave. Ave.
is: Oct. 92 1993 1994 Dec. 95
General Better 48.9 49.5 55.4 70.9
Same 25.2 28.3 18.4 18.9
Worse 25.9 18.1 26.3 10.2
Own Economic Situation Better 47.0 49.5 53.9 63.6
Same 31.2 27.7 27.0 21.2
Worse 21.8 22.8 19.1 15.2
General Economic Situation in East Better 49.0 19.9 --- 49.7
Same 25.2 9.2 --- 8.8
Worse 25.9 71.0 --- 41.5
Social Security Better 15.7 14.4 20.7 18.4
Same 23.8 18.8 19.2 20.9
Worse 60.6 66.8 60.2 60.6
Personal Freedom Better 76.2 69.7 72.1 80.8
Same 19.9 23.8 21.7 16.5
Worse 3.9 6.5 6.1 2.7
Relations with Other People Better 4.9 4.5 5.7 5.7
Same 51.3 47.1 37.6 40.0
Worse 43.8 48.4 56.7 54.3
Source: Politbarometer
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Table 21
An East-West Comparison of
Satisfaction with Different Societal Conditions
Education Equal Oppors. for Social
Rights Advance. Security
East West East West East West East West
1990 69 84 79 71 47 78 -- --
1991 60 89 60 69 53 81 -- --
1992 69 85 44 70 52 79 -- --
1993 63 81 43 67 47 72 23 60
1994 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
1995 57 84 44 73 43 72 28 63
To be Economic Protection Chance for
Treated Situation from Crime a Job
Justly
East West East West East West East West
1990 33 69 14 87 58 63 -- --
1991 44 69 21 82 15 59 -- --
1992 37 64 23 65 10 48 -- --
1993 31 63 17 43 10 44 10 41
1994 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
1995 33 59 29 51 14 41 9 38
Source: M. Berger, M. Jung, and D. Roth (1995) Einstellungen zu aktuellen Fragen der Innenpolitik 1995
in Deutschland. Mannheim: Institut für Praxisorientierte Sozialforschung, p. 16.
Percent saying very or mainly satisfied to the question:
Please tell us how satisfied or dissatisfied your are with repspect to the following social conditions in
Germany. Are you very satisfied, mainly satisfied, mainly dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?
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Table 22
Colonization of East by West?
East: West:
Nov. Oct. Nov. Oct.
1990 1991 1990 1991
Appropriate 46 53 33 27
Inappropriate 40 30 53 61
Not sure, Do not know 14 17 14 12
Source: Noelle-Neumann und Köcher, 1993,p.478.
Asked only of those who claimed that the had heard the term "colonization" in the context
of entry of the GDR into the Federal Republic (in 1990: E:36%, W:29%; in 1991: E:
49%, W: 37%). Percent who found the characterization either appropriate or
inappropriate:
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Table 23
Optimism, 1949-1996
(Percent saying that it is with hopes that they enter the coming year)
West East
1949 48 --
1950 27 --
1951 45 --
1952 48 --
1953 60 --
1954 54 --
1955 61 --
1956 53 --
1957 58 --
1958 53 --
1959 65 --
1960 58 --
1961 44 --
1962 61 --
1963 62 --
1964 65 --
1965 49 --
1966 52 --
1967 56 --
1968 65 --
1969 63 --
1970 54 --
1971 44 --
1972 60 --
1973 30 --
1974 44 --
1975 52 --
1976 54 --
1977 55 --
1978 60 --
1979 51 --
1980 34 --
1981 32 --
1982 34 --
1983 45 --
1984 55 --
1985 61 --
1986 59 --
1987 57 --
1988 59 --
1989 68 --
1990 57 50
1991 55 58
1992 34 47
1993 39 50
1994 57 60
1995 47 52
1996 43 47
Allesnbach
Hope data for the period from 1949 through 1989 for West Germany
taken from Wolfgang Glatzer, et al., RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS IN WEST GERMANY
1960-1990. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1992. Source for
data is Allensbach.
Date for 90 through 95 from Allensbacher Bericht, 1995 / Nr. 29. Data for 96 from Allensbacher Berichte,
1996 / Nr. 26.
Question (and answer options):
"Is it with hopes or with fears that you enter the coming year?"
With hope
With misgivings
With skepticism
Undecided
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Table 24
Social Trust, 1948-1994
% Saying People Can
be Trusted
West East
1948  9
1953 13
1957 19
1964 28
1967 26
1969 23
1972 32
1973 27
1976 39
1978 35
1979 30
1981 29
1983 37
1985 35
1986 38
1987 42
1988 39
1989 38
1990 37 26
1991 35 24
1992 42 28
1993 45 29
1994 35 26
Source: Allensbach
Do you think most people can be trusted?" from Noelle-Neuman, 1994, p.228 (data for
1973 and 79 from Noelle-Neumann and Piel, Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie,
1978-1983). Note data for 1948 and 1959 reported in Conradt, 1980, p.254.
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Table 25
Levels of Trust: A Cross-Country Comparison
% Inter-
personal
Trust,
1981-91
1.0 Norway 60.0
2.0 Sweden 57.0
3.0 Denmark 52.5
4.0 Greece 50.0
5.0 Canada 49.0
6.0 Australia 48.5
7.0 Netherlands 45.0
8.0 Britain 43.0
9.0 Japan 42.5
10.0 Ireland 42.0
11.0 U.S.A. 41.0
12.0 Spain 35.0
13.0 Germany 32.0
Luxembourg 32.0
15.0 Belgium 29.0
16.0 Portugal 28.0
17.0 Italy 27.0
18.0 France 25.5
From: E. N. Muller and M. S. Seligson (1994) "Civic Culture and Democracy: The
Question of Causal Relationships" American Political Science Review 88/3: 635-652.
Data taken from Table A-1, p.648
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Table 26:
Easterners‘ Views on Whether
the Introduction of Western Model
Was a Mistake
Right Wrong
May, 1992 69.6 30.4
Oct., 1992 67.8 32.2
Jan., 1993 73.3 26.7
Apr., 1993 71.4 28.6
May, 1993 68.8 32.2
Jun., 1993 67.7 32.3
Jul., 1993 72.9 27.5
Oct., 1993 74.5 25.5
Jan., 1994 72.2 27.8
Apr. 1994 72.8 27.2
Aug., 1994 73.2 26.8
Sep., 1994 71.6 28.4
Oct., 1994 76.2 23.4
Apr.-May, 1995 72.4 27.6
July, 1995 77.1 22.9
Oct., 1995 81.8 18.3
Sources: Politbarometer and IPOS
In the first free election in the DDR the citizens decided for the introduction of a political
order based on the western model. Was this generally right or wrong?
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Table 27
Better to Have Chosen a Third Way?
East West
Nov. Oct. Dec. Dec.
1990 1992 1993 1993
Would have liked a new form of government 39 47 46 10
Undecided, no response 20 20 21 21
Satisfied that the Federal Republic won out 41 33 33 69
From Noelle.Neumann (1994, p. 220), Allensbach
"Recently somebody said to ’When reunification took place, a real chance was lost to
create a new form of goverment that comines a market economy, human values and
socialism.’ Would you have like to see a new form of government too, or are you quite
satisfied that the Federal Republic’s form won out?"
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Table 28
Evaluations of Economic Systems
Panel a:
Market or Socialist Economy?
East West
Market Economy 39 82
Undecided 44  5
Socialist Economy 17 13
Source: Allensbach (Noelle-Neumann, 1994, p. 218)
"In your opinion, where are people better off: in a market economy or under socialism?"
Panel b:
Decline in Favorable Opinion Regarding
Federal Republic’s Economic System
(% with Good Opinion of Economic System)
East West
1990 72* --
1991 54* --
1992 44 --
1993 35 ---
1994 38 57
1995 24 54
1996 24 45
*
-- Averages from multiple surveys conducted during the year.
(Sources: Allensbach as reported in Noelle-Neumann, 1994, p. 217 and Behres, 1997,
p. 25)
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Table 29
West: Satisfaction with Government Performance
Quarterly Averages, Politbarometer
Quarter Satisfied Neither Dissatisfied
Satisfied nor
Dissatisfied
1977.1 53.1 13.6 33.4
1977.2 55.3 13.9 30.9
1977.3 55.1 14.4 30.6
1977.4 57.0 15.0 28.0
1978.1 61.4 10.5 28.1
1978.2 65.3 10.3 24.4
1978.3 67.0 10.9 22.2
1978.4 70.3 11.5 18.3
1979.1 71.8 9.8 18.5
1979.2 71.6 10.1 18.3
1979.3 74.0 9.3 16.8
1979.4 72.9 9.3 17.9
1980.1 74.5 8.6 16.8
1980.2 73.8 8.4 17.8
1980.3 73.3 9.2 17.6
1980.4 66.3 9.8 23.9
1981.1 61.8 10.1 28.0
1981.2 59.0 10.3 30.6
1981.3 53.2 10.9 36.0
1981.4 53.7 11.0 35.2
1982.1 53.1 10.2 36.7
1982.2 51.1 11.8 37.2
1982.3 43.9 10.9 45.5
1982.4 53.4 17.0 29.7
1983.1 54.9 13.9 31.2
1983.2 58.0 14.4 27.6
1983.3 58.1 12.3 29.7
1983.4 54.4 13.4 32.3
1984.1 55.5 13.1 31.5
1984.2 51.3 12.1 36.6
1984.3 54.9 11.3 33.9
1984.4 51.8 11.3 36.8
1985.1 52.9 12.0 35.0
1985.2 47.2 11.5 41.1
1985.3 47.1 11.8 41.1
1985.4 52.2 11.7 36.2
1986.1 53.9 10.5 35.6
1986.2 52.9 11.0 36.1
1986.3 57.8 11.1 31.1
1986.4 59.4 12.1 28.7
1987.1 60.1 9.5 30.3
1987.2 59.6 11.2 29.2
1987.3 53.6 13.0 33.6
1987.4 58.6 8.6 32.9
1988.1 50.7 11.0 38.2
1988.2 47.0 12.5 40.5
1988.3 42.9 13.3 43.9
1988.4 41.7 11.7 46.4
1989.1 39.2 13.5 47.4
1989.2 45.3 12.9 41.8
1989.3 52.2 14.3 33.5
1989.4 58.2 12.8 28.9
1990.1 64.6 11.1 24.4
1990.2 63.7 11.2 25.1
1990.3 66.3 11.2 22.6
1990.4 71.0 9.3 19.7
1991.1 56.6 11.4 32.0
1991.2 51.3 11.6 37.0
1991.3 48.3 13.0 38.7
1991.4 50.8 14.1 35.0
1992.1 50.8 12.3 36.7
1992.2 38.6 13.6 47.9
1992.3 34.7 12.6 52.9
1992.4 36.7 12.8 50.5
1993.1 28.1 10.6 61.3
1993.2 30.3 13.0 56.7
1993.3 30.2 12.3 57.4
1993.4 28.5 12.4 59.2
1994.1 33.5 12.5 54.2
1994.2 42.2 13.3 44.5
1994.3 50.2 13.7 36.3
1994.4 49.2 13.6 37.2
1995.1 45.6 14.8 39.7
1995.2 51.0 12.8 36.2
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1995.3 51.9 13.6 34.6
1995.4 49.2 13.5 37.3
1996.1 40.9 13.1 46.0
1996.2 41.6 12.7 45.7
1996.3 --- --- ---
1996.4 36.9 12.7 50.4
Source: Politbarometer
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Table 30
East: Satisfaction with Government Performance
Quarterly Averages, Politbarometer
Quarter Satisfied Neither Dissatisfied
Satisfied nor
Dissatisfied
1990.1 --- --- ---
1990.2 --- --- ---
1990.3 47.1 15.3 37.6
1990.4 64.6 13.1 22.2
1991.1 45.4 9.3 45.1
1991.2 48.4 10.9 40.8
1991.3 49.2 11.2 39.6
1991.4 52.6 11.0 36.3
1992.1 52.9 11.7 35.5
1992.2 41.3 10.6 48.3
1992.3 34.5 11.6 54.1
1992.4 39.4 10.5 50.2
1993.1 31.0 10.1 59.0
1993.2 32.1 10.3 57.6
1993.3 31.1 9.5 59.5
1993.4 31.7 10.0 58.4
1994.1 31.8 9.8 58.5
1994.2 37.4 10.9 51.8
1994.3 45.9 9.8 44.4
1994.4 47.7 11.5 40.7
1995.1 41.1 11.3 47.6
1995.2 43.3 12.3 44.3
1995.3 55.0 13.1 31.9
1995.4 50.6 15.3 34.1
1996.1 40.1 15.8 44.1
1996.2 44.6 13.9 41.6
1996.3 --- --- ---
1996.4 36.6 11.5 51.9
Source: Politbarometer
90 On the Road to Weimar?
Table 31
Satisfaction with Democracy, I
Euro- IPOS
barometer
Percent Percent
Satisfied Very
or Fairly Satisfied
Satisfied or
in: Satisfied
in:
West East West East
1976 80.1 --- --- ---
1977 81.1 --- --- ---
1978 80.6 --- --- ---
1979 84.5 --- --- ---
1980 77.6 --- --- ---
1981 75.4 --- --- ---
1982 71.2 --- --- ---
1983 75.8 --- --- ---
1984 74.4 --- 72.7 ---
1985 73.6 --- 69.3 ---
1986 77.9 --- 71.4 ---
1987 73.8 --- 79.3 ---
1988 73.4 --- 72.5 ---
1989 79.1 --- 73.1 ---
1990 83.1 --- 84.3 ---
1991 69.9 40.0 78.1 52.3
1992 63.7 41.5 65.3 48.0
1993 56.7 35.0 53.9 41.4
1994 61.1 38.2 --- ---
1995 --- --- 66.8 53.2
Eurobarometer, Satisfaction with Democracy in Germany
(On the whole, are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied
with the way democracy works in Germany?)
Data provided by Dieter Fuchs, WZB.
IPOS, Satisfaction with Democracy in Germany
(What in general would you say your to democracy in Germany, that is to our entire
political system? Are you very satsified, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?)
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Table 32
Satisfaction with Democracy, II
East West
1977.1 --- ---
1977.2 --- 76.4
1977.3 --- 73.4
1977.4 --- 78.1
1978.1 --- ---
1978.2 --- 76.3
1978.3 --- 80.0
1978.4 --- 79.1
1979.1 --- ---
1979.2 --- 79.9
1979.3 --- 81.1
1979.4 --- 84.0
1980.1 --- 82.8
1980.2 --- 77.6
1980.3 --- 81.6
1980.4 --- 79.6
1981.1 --- 69.9
1981.2 --- 64.3
1981.3 --- 56.9
1981.4 --- 54.1
1982.1 --- 54.4
1982.2 --- 62.6
1982.3 --- ---
1982.4 --- 71.7
1983.1 --- ---
1983.2 --- 73.9
1983.3 --- 70.3
1983.4 --- 68.3
1984.1 --- 69.4
1984.2 --- 65.0
1984.3 --- 72.3
1984.4 --- 65.6
1985.1 --- 64.7
1985.2 --- 67.4
1985.3 --- 68.3
1985.4 --- 69.5
1986.1 --- 71.4
1986.2 --- 66.5
1986.3 --- 76.5
1986.4 --- 74.0
1987.1 --- 76.7
1987.2 --- 73.7
1987.3 --- 75.3
1987.4 --- 73.7
1988.1 --- 68.8
1988.2 --- 67.3
1988.3 --- 68.4
1988.4 --- 76.7
1989.1 --- 62.1
1989.2 --- 64.4
1989.3 --- 68.8
1989.4 --- 77.9
1990.1 --- 78.9
1990.2 --- 76.9
1990.3 --- 74.7
1990.4 56.7 80.7
1991.1 42.1 72.3
1991.2 46.0 70.2
1991.3 47.5 67.3
1991.4 48.5 66.8
1992.1 49.4 65.1
1992.2 40.3 59.3
1992.3 35.6 63.0
1992.4 34.6 62.8
1993.1 33.5 58.9
1993.2 31.4 57.9
1993.3 30.2 53.0
1993.4 28.7 58.9
1994.1 29.5 59.8
1994.2 33.7 62.1
1994.3 43.9 68.1
1994.4 43.2 68.6
1995.1 41.0 61.8
1995.2 40.6 65.8
1995.3 48.3 67.7
1995.4 47.7 65.6
1996.1 44.0 56.6
1996.2 38.9 62.6
1996.3 39.7 61.8
1996.4 33.9 51.6
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Percent satisfied with the Federal Republic’s democratic system. Based on the
Politbarometer variable. Percent is the based only on valid responses. Wording of
question has changed slightly over time as has the format of the response possibilities.
Variable here is a count of those answering with a 1 or a 2 during 1977 through 1988,
and a 1 during 1989 through 1996. Question wording is as follows:
77-88: "What do you think about democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany, that
is about our political parties and entire political system? Do you tend more to be (1)
very satisfied, (2) satisfied, (3) unsatisfied or (4) very unsatisfied?"
89-92:"What do you think about democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany, that
is about our entire political system? Do you tend more to be (1) satisfied or (2)
dissatisfied?"
93-96: What do you think about democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany? Do
you tend more to be (1) satisfied or (2) dissatisfied?"
Quarterly averages
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Figure 10
Figure 11
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Table 33
Variables Included in the
Government and System Satisfaction Equations
Variables:
Semi-annual average of percent satisfied with the performance of the
governing coalition in the Federal Government. Based on the
Politbarometer "Skalometer: Koalition," an eleven-point scale ranging from
-5 (completely dissatisfied) to +5 (completely satisfied). Zero on the scale
is treated as the neutral point (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied). Variable
here is the percentage of valid responses coded from +1 through +5.
Percent is the based only on valid responses.
Semi-annual average of percent satisfied with the Federal Republic’s
democratic system. Based on the Politbarometer variable. Percent is the
based only on valid responses. Wording of question has changed slightly
over time as has the format of the response possibilities. Variable here is
a percent count of those answering with a 1 or a 2 during 1977 through
1988, and a 1 during 1989 through 1996. Question wording is as follows:
77-88: "What do you think about democracy in the Federal Republic of
Germany, that is about our political parties and entire political system? Do
you tend more to be (1) very satisfied, (2) satisfied, (3) unsatisfied or (4)
very unsatisfied?"
89-92:"What do you think about democracy in the Federal Republic of
Germany, that is about our entire political system? Do you tend more to
be (1) satisfied or (2) dissatisfied?"
93-96: What do you think about democracy in the Federal Republic of
Germany? Do you tend more to be (1) satisfied or (2) dissatisfied?"
Taxation burden of the average employee. Based on the Statistisches
Bundesamt’s calculations regarding the average worker’s gross and net
wages and salaries. Taxation burden is initially calculated as the difference
between the gross and net pay variables expressed as a percentage of the
gross pay variable. Variable is then transformed by subtracting the average
tax rate in 1977. Three points to note then: (1) this tax burden variable does
not take into account indirect taxes (VAT, etc); (2) it does not take into
account the taxation burden of self-employed or those whose income is
solely or significantly based on interests and profits; (3) it needs to be seen
as taking into account only the tax burden relative to 1977.
Economic growth. Percent rate of change in real GDP over the period one
year prior.
Electoral Cycle variable. A simple ordinal variable reflecting the tendency
for government support to decline and then rise again between elections.
Generally the series runs as follows, starting with the election period:
0,-1,-2,-3,-4,-3,-2,-1.
Unification bonus: a dummy variable meant to capture the general euphoria
surrounding the events in the GDR during 1989 (i.e., the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the collapse of the SED Regime).
Unification hangover ("Vereinigungskater"): a dummy variable meant to
represent the general loss of euphoria following Unification and the first
all-German federal elections.
Unemployment rate (in percent terms) as provided by Bundesanstalt für
Arbeit.
Inflation rate: rate of inflation (relative to the period one year prior) in the
consumer price index from the Statistisches Bundesamt.
GSAT
DSAT
TAXBUR
GRO
ECYCLE
UNIFPLUS
UNIFMIN
UNEMP
INFL
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Government change variable. Coded 1 in the period where a new
government is popularly elected, and zero otherwise. Note that this
occurred only once in the period under study, i.e., in the early 1980s.
GOV D
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